Signs and symptoms of Fregoli's:

- delusions

- visual memory deficit

- deficit in self-monitoring

- deficit in self-awareness

- hallucinations

- deficit in executive functions

- deficit in cognitive flexibility

- history of seizure activity

- epileptogenic activity

The symptoms of the syndrome of subjective doubles are not clearly defined in medical literature, however, there are some defining features of the delusion:

- The existence of the delusion, by definition, is not a widely accepted cultural belief.

- The patient insists that the double he/she sees is real even when presented with contradictory evidence.

- Paranoia and/or spatial visualization ability impairments are present.

Similarities to other disorders are often noted in literature. Prosopagnosia, or the inability to recognize faces, may be related to this disorder due to the similarity of symptoms. Subjective doubles syndrome is also similar to delusional autoscopy, also known as an out-of-body experience, and therefore is occasionally referred to as an "autoscopic type" delusion. However, subjective doubles delusion differs from an autoscopic delusion: autoscopy often occurs during times of extreme stress, and can usually be treated by relieving the said stressor.

The syndrome of subjective doubles is usually accompanied by another mental disorder or organic brain syndrome, and may appear during or after the onset of the other disorder. Often, co-occurrence of subjective doubles with other types of delusional misidentification syndromes, especially Capgras syndrome, also occurs.

Several variations of the syndrome have been reported in literature:

- The doubles may appear at different ages of oneself.

- Some patients describe their double as both a physically and psychologically identical copy, rather than a purely physical copy. This is also known as clonal pluralization of the self, another type of delusional misidentification syndrome that may or may not be the same type of disorder (see #Controversy, below). In this case, depersonalization may be a symptom.

- Reverse subjective doubles occurs when the patient believes his/her own self (either physical or mental) is being transformed into another person. (see the case of Mr. A in #Presentation)

"The following case describes a patient who was diagnosed with psychotic depression, bipolar disorder, and the syndrome of subjective doubles:"

Taken from Kamanitz et al., 1989:

"The following case describes a patient who has been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder along with multiple delusional misidentification syndromes (subjective doubles, Capgras delusion, intermetamorphosis)":

Taken from Silva et al., 1994:

"The following case describes a patient who has been diagnosed with chronic paranoid schizophrenia and reverse subjective doubles:"

Taken from Vasavada and Masand, 1992:

The Fregoli delusion, or the delusion of doubles, is a rare disorder in which a person holds a delusional belief that different people are in fact a single person who changes appearance or is in disguise. The syndrome may be related to a brain lesion and is often of a paranoid nature, with the delusional person believing themselves persecuted by the person they believe is in disguise.

A person with the Fregoli delusion can also inaccurately recall places, objects, and events. This disorder can be explained by "associative nodes". The associative nodes serve as a biological link of information about other people with a particular familiar face (to the patient). This means that for any face that is similar to a recognizable face to the patient, the patient will recall that face as the person they know.

The Fregoli delusion is classed both as a monothematic delusion, since it only encompasses one delusional topic, and as a delusional misidentification syndrome (DMS), a class of delusional beliefs that involves misidentifying people, places, or objects. Like Capgras delusion, psychiatrists believe it is related to a breakdown in normal face perception.

The delusions that fall under this category are:

- Capgras delusion: the belief that (usually) a close relative or spouse has been replaced by an identical-looking impostor.

- Fregoli delusion: the belief that various people whom the believer meets are actually the same person in disguise.

- Intermetamorphosis: the belief that people in one's environment swap identities with each other while maintaining the same appearance.

- Subjective doubles: a person believes there is a doppelgänger or double of him- or herself carrying out independent actions.

- Cotard delusion: the belief that oneself is dead or does not exist; sometimes coupled with the belief that one is putrefying or missing internal organs.

- Mirrored-self misidentification: the belief that one's reflection in a mirror is some other person.

- Reduplicative paramnesia: the belief that a familiar person, place, object, or body part has been duplicated. For example, a person may believe that they are, in fact, not in the hospital to which they were admitted, but in an identical-looking hospital in a different part of the country.

- Somatoparaphrenia: the delusion where one denies ownership of a limb or an entire side of one's body (often connected with stroke).

Note that some of these delusions are sometimes grouped under the umbrella term of delusional misidentification syndrome.

A monothematic delusion is a delusional state that concerns only one particular topic. This is contrasted by what is sometimes called "multi-thematic" or "polythematic" delusions where the person has a range of delusions (typically the case of schizophrenia). These disorders can occur within the context of schizophrenia or dementia or they can occur without any other signs of mental illness. When these disorders are found outside the context of mental illness, they are often caused by organic dysfunction as a result of traumatic brain injury, stroke, or neurological illness.

People who experience these delusions as a result of organic dysfunction often do not have any obvious intellectual deficiency nor do they have any other symptoms. Additionally, a few of these people even have some awareness that their beliefs are bizarre, yet they cannot be persuaded that their beliefs are false.

Capgras delusion is a psychiatric disorder in which a person holds a delusion that a friend, spouse, parent, or other close family member (or pet) has been replaced by an identical impostor. The Capgras delusion is classified as a delusional misidentification syndrome, a class of delusional beliefs that involves the misidentification of people, places, or objects. It can occur in acute, transient, or chronic forms. Cases in which patients hold the belief that time has been "warped" or "substituted" have also been reported.

The delusion most commonly occurs in patients diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, but has also been seen in patients suffering from brain injury and dementia. It presents often in individuals with a neurodegenerative disease, particularly at an older age. It has also been reported as occurring in association with diabetes, hypothyroidism, and migraine attacks. In one isolated case, the Capgras delusion was temporarily induced in a healthy subject by the drug ketamine. It occurs more frequently in females, with a female:male ratio of approximately 3:2. It is worth noting that there is historical and quite probably modern use of the Political decoy as well as Celebrity lookalike, and impersonation is used by criminals, as well. Although 'delusion' is defined as when a patient holds a false belief "in spite of incontrovertible evidence", such evidence is difficult to produce (in the case of Capgras symptoms), whether lookalikes exist or not. This does not deter psychiatrists from prescribing pharmaceutical chemicals for persons describing these situations with little, if any, investigation into the claims, though it seems even one actual encounter with a genuine impersonator (whether sinister or not) has a notably unnerving effect on future interactions with that actual person, and possibly leading to paranoia of others being impersonated. Carefully targeted identity thefts in this sense can cause quite a few real problems, ranging from confusion to petty theft, business and domestic situations going awry, sexual relationship sabotage or confusion (possibility of unplanned pregnancy and risk of STD exposure), and financial fraud.

The following two case reports are examples of the Capgras delusion in a psychiatric setting:

The following case is an instance of the Capgras delusion resulting from a neurodegenerative disease:

Delusional misidentification syndrome is an umbrella term, introduced by Christodoulou (in his book "The Delusional Misidentification Syndromes", Karger, Basel, 1986) for a group of delusional disorders that occur in the context of mental and neurological illness. They all involve a belief that the identity of a person, object, or place has somehow changed or has been altered. As these delusions typically only concern one particular topic, they also fall under the category called monothematic delusions.

This psychopathological syndrome is usually considered to include four main variants:

- The Capgras delusion is the belief that (usually) a close relative or spouse has been replaced by an identical-looking impostor.

- The Fregoli delusion is the belief that various people the believer meets are actually the same person in disguise.

- Intermetamorphosis is the belief that people in the environment swap identities with each other whilst maintaining the same appearance.

- Subjective doubles, described by Christodoulou in 1978 ("American Journal of Psychiatry" 135, 249, 1978), is the belief that there is a doppelgänger or double of him- or herself carrying out independent actions.

However, similar delusional beliefs, often singularly or more rarely reported, are sometimes also considered to be part of the delusional misidentification syndrome. For example:

- Mirrored-self misidentification is the belief that one's reflection in a mirror is some other person.

- Reduplicative paramnesia is the belief that a familiar person, place, object, or body part has been duplicated. For example, a person may believe that they are in fact not in the hospital to which they were admitted, but an identical-looking hospital in a different part of the country, despite this being obviously false.

- The Cotard delusion is a rare disorder in which people hold a delusional belief that they are dead (either figuratively or literally), do not exist, are putrefying, or have lost their blood or internal organs. In rare instances, it can include delusions of immortality.

- Syndrome of delusional companions is the belief that objects (such as soft toys) are sentient beings.

- Clonal pluralization of the self, where a person believes there are multiple copies of him- or herself, identical both physically and psychologically but physically separate and distinct.

There is considerable evidence that disorders such as the Capgras or Fregoli syndromes are associated with disorders of face perception and recognition. However, it has been suggested that all misidentification problems exist on a continuum of anomalies of familiarity, from déjà vu at one end to the formation of delusional beliefs at the other.

Brief reactive psychosis, referred to in the DSM IV-TR as "brief psychotic disorder with marked stressor(s)", is the psychiatric term for psychosis which can be triggered by an extremely stressful event in the life of an individual.

Typically such brief psychoses last from a day to a month only, with the delusions, speech disorders and hallucinations eventually yielding to a return to normal functioning.

Brief reactive psychosis generally follows a recognisably traumatic life event like divorce or homelessness, but may be triggered by any subjective experience which appears catastrophic to the person affected.

Among such stressors are the death of a loved one, professional loss such as unexpectedly losing one's job or otherwise becoming unemployed, or serious adverse changes in the patient's personal life, such as the breakdown of their family through divorce, etc.

It must be emphasised that this is by no means an exhaustive list of stressful life events, because the events which trigger brief reactive psychosis tend, due to the individualistic nature of human psychology, to be extremely personalized. BRP may be the first breakdown for someone with a chronic psychiatric disorder but only time will tell whether the disorder will be brief or lifelong, whether BRP or a chronic condition that is controlled well enough by medication that symptoms do not return.

The core symptom of depersonalization-derealization disorder is the subjective experience of "unreality in one's self", or detachment from one's surroundings. People who are diagnosed with depersonalization also experience an urge to question and think critically about the nature of reality and existence.

Individuals who experience depersonalization can feel divorced from their own personal physicality by sensing their body sensations, feelings, emotions and behaviors as not belonging to themselves. As such, a recognition of one's self breaks down. Depersonalization can result in very high anxiety levels, which can intensify these perceptions even further.

Individuals with depersonalization describe feeling disconnected from their physicality; feeling as if they are not completely occupying their own body; feeling as if their speech or physical movements are out of their control; feeling detached from their own thoughts or emotions; and experiencing themselves and their lives from a distance. While depersonalization involves detachment from one's "self", individuals with derealization feel detached from their "surroundings", as if the world around them is foggy, dreamlike, or visually distorted. Some people with depersonalization disorder also have visual alterations such as rapid fluctuations in light. While the exact cause of these perceptual changes has not been determined, it is thought that they may be due to previous drug use. These perceptual changes differ from true hallucinatory phenomena, as they are closer to being optical distortions or illusions rather than psychotic breaks from reality. Individuals with the disorder commonly describe a feeling as though time is "passing" them by and they are not in the notion of the present. These experiences which strike at the core of a person's identity and consciousness may cause a person to feel uneasy or anxious.

Factors that tend to diminish symptoms are comforting personal interactions, intense physical or emotional stimulation, and relaxation. Distracting oneself (by engaging in conversation or watching a movie, for example) may also provide temporary relief. Some other factors that are identified as relieving symptom severity are diet and/or exercise, while alcohol and fatigue are listed by some as worsening their symptoms.

First experiences with depersonalization may be frightening, with patients fearing loss of control, dissociation from the rest of society and functional impairment. The majority of people with depersonalization-derealization disorder misinterpret the symptoms, thinking that they are signs of serious psychosis or brain dysfunction. This commonly leads to an increase of anxiety experienced by the patient, and obsession, which contributes to the worsening of symptoms.

Occasional, brief moments of mild depersonalization can be experienced by many members of the general population; however, depersonalization-derealization disorder occurs when these feelings are strong, severe, persistent, or recurrent and when these feelings interfere with daily functioning.

The diagnostic criteria defined in section 300.6 of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders are as follows:

1. Longstanding or recurring feelings of being detached from one's mental processes or body, as if one is observing them from the outside or in a dream.

2. Reality testing is unimpaired during depersonalization

3. Depersonalization causes significant difficulties or distress at work, or social and other important areas of life functioning.

4. Depersonalization does not only occur while the individual is experiencing another mental disorder, and is not associated with substance use or a medical illness.

The DSM-IV-TR specifically recognizes three possible additional features of depersonalization disorder:

1. Derealization, experiencing the external world as strange or unreal.

2. Macropsia or micropsia, an alteration in the perception of object size or shape.

3. A sense that other people seem unfamiliar or mechanical.

Dissociation is defined as a "disruption in the usually integrated functions of consciousness, memory, identity and perception, leading to a fragmentation of the coherence, unity and continuity of the sense of self. Depersonalisation is a particular type of dissociation involving a disrupted integration of self-perceptions with the sense of self, so that individuals experiencing depersonalisation are in a subjective state of feeling estranged, detached or disconnected from their own being."

Depersonalization is the third most common psychological symptom, after feelings of anxiety and feelings of depression. Depersonalization is a symptom of anxiety disorders, such as panic disorder. It can also accompany sleep deprivation (often occurring when suffering from jet lag), migraine, epilepsy (especially temporal lobe epilepsy), obsessive-compulsive disorder, stress, anxiety, and some cases of low latent inhibition. Interoceptive exposure is a non-pharmacological method that can be used to induce depersonalization.

A similar and overlapping concept called ipseity disturbance (ipse is Latin for "self" or "itself") may be part of the core process of schizophrenia spectrum disorders. However, specific to the schizophrenia spectrum seems to be "a "dis"location of first-person perspective such that self and other or self and world may seem to be non-distinguishable, or in which the individual self or field of consciousness takes on an inordinate significance in relation to the objective or intersubjective world" (emphasis in original).

For the purposes of evaluation and measurement depersonalisation can be conceived of as a construct and scales are now available to map its dimensions in time and space. A study of undergraduate students found that individuals high on the depersonalization/derealization subscale of the Dissociative Experiences Scale exhibited a more pronounced cortisol response. Individuals high on the absorption subscale, which measures a subject's experiences of concentration to the exclusion of awareness of other events, showed weaker cortisol responses.

The DSM-IV-TR defines a hypomanic episode as including, over the course of at least four days, elevated mood plus three of the following symptoms OR irritable mood plus four of the following symptoms:

- pressured speech

- inflated self-esteem or grandiosity

- decreased need for sleep

- flight of ideas or the subjective experience that thoughts are racing

- easily distracted and attention-deficit; the inability to 'follow-through' with complete tasks, as similar to attention deficit hyperactivity disorder

- increase in psychomotor agitation, or occasionally in some, increased irritability

- hypersexuality

- involvement in pleasurable activities that may have a high potential for negative psycho-social or physical consequences (e.g., the person engages in unrestrained buying sprees, sexual indiscretions, reckless driving, physical and verbal conflicts, foolish business investments, quitting a job to pursue some grandiose goal, etc).

Individuals who experience depersonalization feel divorced from their own personal self by sensing their body sensations, feelings, emotions, behaviors etc. as not belonging to the same person or identity. Often a person who has experienced depersonalization claims that things seem unreal or hazy. Also, a recognition of a self breaks down (hence the name). Depersonalization can result in very high anxiety levels, which further increase these perceptions.

Depersonalization is a subjective experience of unreality in one's self, while derealization is unreality of the outside world. Although most authors currently regard depersonalization (self) and derealization (surroundings) as independent constructs, many do not want to separate derealization from depersonalization.

Depressive mixed states occur when patients experience depression and non-euphoric, usually subsyndromal, hypomania at the same time. As mentioned previously, it is particularly difficult to diagnose BP-II when a patient is in this state.

In a mixed state, mood is depressed, but the following symptoms of hypomania present as well:

- Irritability

- Mental overactivity

- Behavioral overactivity

Mixed states are associated with greater levels of suicidality than non-mixed depression. Antidepressants may increase this risk.

It is during depressive episodes that BP-II patients often seek help. Symptoms may be syndromal or subsyndromal. Depressive BP-II symptoms may include five or more of the below symptoms (at least one of them must be either depressed mood or loss of interest/pleasure). In order to be diagnosed, they need to be present only during the same two-week period, as a change from previous hypomanic functioning:

- Depressed mood most of the day, nearly every day, as indicated by either subjective report (e.g., feels sad, empty, or hopeless) or observation made by others (e.g., appears tearful). (Note: In children and adolescents, can be irritable mood.)

- Markedly diminished interest or pleasure in all, or almost all, activities most of the day, nearly every day (as indicated by either subjective account or observation).

- Significant weight loss when not dieting or weight gain (e.g., a change of more than 5% of body weight in a month), or decrease or increase in appetite nearly every day. (Note: In children, consider failure to make expected weight gain.)

- Insomnia or hypersomnia nearly every day.

- Psychomotor agitation or retardation nearly every day (observable by others; not merely subjective feelings of restlessness or being slowed down).

- Fatigue or loss of energy nearly every day.

- Feelings of worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate guilt nearly every day (not merely self-reproach or guilt about being sick).

- Diminished ability to think or concentrate, possible irritability or indecisiveness, nearly every day (either by subjective account or as observed by others).

- Recurrent thoughts of death (not just fear of dying), recurrent suicidal ideation without a specific plan, a suicide attempt, or a specific plan for committing suicide.

Evidence also suggests that BP-II is strongly associated with atypical depression. Essentially, this means that many BP-II patients exhibit reverse vegetative symptoms. BP-II patients may have a tendency to oversleep and overeat, while typically depressed patients sleep and eat less than usual.

Often in those who have experienced their first episode of hypomania – generally without psychotic features – there may be a long or recent history of depression or a mix of hypomania combined with depression (known as mixed-state) prior to the emergence of manic symptoms. This commonly surfaces in the mid to late teens. Because the teenage years are typically an emotionally charged time of life, it is not unusual for mood swings to be passed off as normal hormonal teen behavior and for a diagnosis of bipolar disorder to be missed until there is evidence of an obvious manic or hypomanic phase.

Hypomania may also occur as a side effect of pharmaceuticals prescribed for conditions or diseases other than psychological states or mood disorders. In those instances, as in cases of drug-induced hypomanic episodes in unipolar depressives, the hypomania can almost invariably be eliminated by lowering medication dosage, withdrawing the drug entirely, or changing to a different medication if discontinuation of treatment is not possible.

Hypomania may also be triggered by the occurrence of a highly exciting event in the patient's situation, such as a substantial financial gain or recognition.

Hypomania can be associated with narcissistic personality disorder.

Memory distrust syndrome is a condition coined by Gísli Guðjónsson and James MacKeith in 1982, in which an individual doubts the accuracy of their memory concerning the content and context of events of which they have experienced. Since the individual does not trust their own memory, they will commonly depend on outside sources of information rather than using their ability for recollection. Some believe that this may be a defense or coping mechanism to a preexisting faulty memory state such as Alzheimer's disease, amnesia, or possibly dementia.

The condition is generally considered to be related to source amnesia, which involves the inability to recall the basis for factual knowledge. The main difference between the two is that source amnesia is a lack of knowing the basis of knowledge, whereas memory distrust syndrome is a lack of believing the knowledge that exists. The fact that an individual lacks the trust in their own memory implies that the individual would have a reason or belief that would prevent them from the trust that most of us have in our recollections. Cases concerning memory distrust syndrome have led to documented false confessions in court cases.

Experiences - are characterized by the presence of the following three factors:

- disembodiment, an apparent location of the self outside one's body;

- impression of seeing the world from an elevated and distanced visuo-spatial perspective or extracorporeal, but egocentric visuo-spatial perspective;

- impression of seeing one's own body from this perspective (autoscopy).

Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience, École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Lausanne, and Department of Neurology, University Hospital, Geneva, Switzerland, have reviewed some of the classical precipitating factors of autoscopy. These are sleep, drug abuse, and general anesthesia as well as neurobiology. They have compared them with recent findings on neurological and neurocognitive mechanisms of the autoscopy. The reviewed data suggest that autoscopic experiences are due to functional disintegration of lower-level multisensory processing and abnormal higher-level self-processing at the temporoparietal junction.

Autoscopy is the experience in which an individual perceives the surrounding environment from a different perspective, from a position outside of his or her own body. Autoscopy comes from the ancient Greek ("self") and ("watcher").

Autoscopy has been of interest to humankind from time immemorial and is abundant in the folklore, mythology, and spiritual narratives of most ancient and modern societies. Cases of autoscopy are commonly encountered in modern psychiatric practice. According to neurological research, autoscopic experiences are hallucinations.

In the DSM-5 the disorder has been renamed somatic symptom disorder (SSD), and includes SSD with predominantly somatic complaints (previously referred to as somatization disorder), and SSD with pain features (previously known as pain disorder).

In ICD-10, the latest version of the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems, somatization syndrome is described as:

ICD-10 also includes the following subgroups of somatization syndrome:

- Undifferentiated somatoform disorder

- Hypochondriasis

- Somatoform autonomic dysfunction

- Persistent somatoform pain disorder

- Other somatoform disorders, such ones predominated by dysmenorrhoea, dysphagia, pruritus and torticollis

- Somatoform disorder, unspecified

The main symptom of memory distrust syndrome is the lack of belief in one's own memory, however this comes with the side effect of using outside sources for information. The individual may have their own memory, but will readily change it depending on chosen outside sources. The memories that they have may be correct, but due to their distrust they will still alter their belief of what is true if contrary information is suggested.

For example, a person has a memory of a house and recalls it to be white. Then, a trusted family member begins talking with them and suggests that it was red instead. The afflicted individual will then believe the house was red despite their recollection of it being white. It is unknown if the person's memory of the house is permanently altered; however, they will say that the house was red regardless of the memory's condition.

Also, this does not necessarily allow for confabulatory memory fabrication. Currently it is not believed that an afflicted individual will readily believe an outside source on a memory of which the person is not involved, such as a randomly shared story. This further suggests that memory distrust syndrome solely alters the individual's currently retrievable memories, and not randomized information.