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Affected individuals believe that they are in the process of transforming into an animal or have already transformed into an animal. It has been associated with the altered states of mind that accompany psychosis (the that typically involves delusions and hallucinations) with the transformation only seeming to happen in the mind and behavior of the affected person.
A study on lycanthropy from the McLean Hospital reported on a series of cases and proposed some diagnostic criteria by which lycanthropy could be recognised:
- A patient reports in a moment of lucidity or reminiscence that they sometimes feel as an animal or have felt like one.
- A patient behaves in a manner that resembles animal behavior, for example howling, growling, or crawling.
According to this criteria, either a delusional belief in current or past transformation or behavior that suggests a person thinks of themselves as transformed is considered evidence of clinical lycanthropy. The authors note that, although the condition seems to be an expression of psychosis, there is no specific diagnosis of mental or neurological illness associated with its behavioral consequences.
DSM-IV Criteria
Clinical Lycanthropy is thought to be a cultural manifestation of schizophrenia due to the first 4 symptomatic criteria. The first criteria are delusions, and this fits clinical lycanthropy because a person believing that he or she turns into an animal is a delusion. The second symptom is hallucination, and people with clinical lycanthropy have vivid hallucinations of being an animal, and having traits that animal has, whether it be claws, fur, fangs, or whatever that particular animal has. The next symptom is disorganized speech, from a certain human, cultural perspective. The people who have the diagnosis of clinical lycanthropy often emit the sounds of the animal which they believe they become. So, if a person believes that he or she is a werewolf, they may begin to howl under the moon or sometimes even in the daylight. The last symptom that matches schizophrenia is grossly disorganized behavior. This is appropriate because individuals with clinical lycanthropy often act like the animal they believe they have become, including living outside and changing their diet.
It also seems that lycanthropy is not specific to an experience of human-to-wolf transformation; a wide variety of creatures have been reported as part of the shape-shifting experience. A review of the medical literature from early 2004 lists over thirty published cases of lycanthropy, only the minority of which have wolf or dog themes. Canines are certainly not uncommon, although the experience of being transformed into a hyena, cat, horse, bird or tiger has been reported on more than one occasion. Transformation into frogs, and even bees, has been reported in some instances. In Japan, transformation into foxes and dogs was usual (, ). A 1989 case study described how one individual reported a serial transformation, experiencing a change from human to dog, to horse, and then finally cat, before returning to the reality of human existence after treatment. There are also reports of people who experienced transformation into an animal only listed as "unspecified".
There is a case study of a psychiatric patient who had both clinical lycanthropy and Cotard delusion. The term "ophidianthropy" refers to the delusion that one has been transformed into a snake. Two case studies have been reported.
One important factor may be differences or changes in parts of the brain known to be involved in representing body shape (e.g., see proprioception and body image). A neuroimaging study of two people diagnosed with clinical lycanthropy showed that these areas display unusual activation, suggesting that when people report their bodies are changing shape, they may be genuinely perceiving those feelings.
Signs and symptoms of Fregoli's:
- delusions
- visual memory deficit
- deficit in self-monitoring
- deficit in self-awareness
- hallucinations
- deficit in executive functions
- deficit in cognitive flexibility
- history of seizure activity
- epileptogenic activity
The symptoms of the syndrome of subjective doubles are not clearly defined in medical literature, however, there are some defining features of the delusion:
- The existence of the delusion, by definition, is not a widely accepted cultural belief.
- The patient insists that the double he/she sees is real even when presented with contradictory evidence.
- Paranoia and/or spatial visualization ability impairments are present.
Similarities to other disorders are often noted in literature. Prosopagnosia, or the inability to recognize faces, may be related to this disorder due to the similarity of symptoms. Subjective doubles syndrome is also similar to delusional autoscopy, also known as an out-of-body experience, and therefore is occasionally referred to as an "autoscopic type" delusion. However, subjective doubles delusion differs from an autoscopic delusion: autoscopy often occurs during times of extreme stress, and can usually be treated by relieving the said stressor.
The syndrome of subjective doubles is usually accompanied by another mental disorder or organic brain syndrome, and may appear during or after the onset of the other disorder. Often, co-occurrence of subjective doubles with other types of delusional misidentification syndromes, especially Capgras syndrome, also occurs.
Several variations of the syndrome have been reported in literature:
- The doubles may appear at different ages of oneself.
- Some patients describe their double as both a physically and psychologically identical copy, rather than a purely physical copy. This is also known as clonal pluralization of the self, another type of delusional misidentification syndrome that may or may not be the same type of disorder (see #Controversy, below). In this case, depersonalization may be a symptom.
- Reverse subjective doubles occurs when the patient believes his/her own self (either physical or mental) is being transformed into another person. (see the case of Mr. A in #Presentation)
"The following case describes a patient who was diagnosed with psychotic depression, bipolar disorder, and the syndrome of subjective doubles:"
Taken from Kamanitz et al., 1989:
"The following case describes a patient who has been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder along with multiple delusional misidentification syndromes (subjective doubles, Capgras delusion, intermetamorphosis)":
Taken from Silva et al., 1994:
"The following case describes a patient who has been diagnosed with chronic paranoid schizophrenia and reverse subjective doubles:"
Taken from Vasavada and Masand, 1992:
Delusional misidentification syndrome is an umbrella term, introduced by Christodoulou (in his book "The Delusional Misidentification Syndromes", Karger, Basel, 1986) for a group of delusional disorders that occur in the context of mental and neurological illness. They all involve a belief that the identity of a person, object, or place has somehow changed or has been altered. As these delusions typically only concern one particular topic, they also fall under the category called monothematic delusions.
This psychopathological syndrome is usually considered to include four main variants:
- The Capgras delusion is the belief that (usually) a close relative or spouse has been replaced by an identical-looking impostor.
- The Fregoli delusion is the belief that various people the believer meets are actually the same person in disguise.
- Intermetamorphosis is the belief that people in the environment swap identities with each other whilst maintaining the same appearance.
- Subjective doubles, described by Christodoulou in 1978 ("American Journal of Psychiatry" 135, 249, 1978), is the belief that there is a doppelgänger or double of him- or herself carrying out independent actions.
However, similar delusional beliefs, often singularly or more rarely reported, are sometimes also considered to be part of the delusional misidentification syndrome. For example:
- Mirrored-self misidentification is the belief that one's reflection in a mirror is some other person.
- Reduplicative paramnesia is the belief that a familiar person, place, object, or body part has been duplicated. For example, a person may believe that they are in fact not in the hospital to which they were admitted, but an identical-looking hospital in a different part of the country, despite this being obviously false.
- The Cotard delusion is a rare disorder in which people hold a delusional belief that they are dead (either figuratively or literally), do not exist, are putrefying, or have lost their blood or internal organs. In rare instances, it can include delusions of immortality.
- Syndrome of delusional companions is the belief that objects (such as soft toys) are sentient beings.
- Clonal pluralization of the self, where a person believes there are multiple copies of him- or herself, identical both physically and psychologically but physically separate and distinct.
There is considerable evidence that disorders such as the Capgras or Fregoli syndromes are associated with disorders of face perception and recognition. However, it has been suggested that all misidentification problems exist on a continuum of anomalies of familiarity, from déjà vu at one end to the formation of delusional beliefs at the other.
The Fregoli delusion, or the delusion of doubles, is a rare disorder in which a person holds a delusional belief that different people are in fact a single person who changes appearance or is in disguise. The syndrome may be related to a brain lesion and is often of a paranoid nature, with the delusional person believing themselves persecuted by the person they believe is in disguise.
A person with the Fregoli delusion can also inaccurately recall places, objects, and events. This disorder can be explained by "associative nodes". The associative nodes serve as a biological link of information about other people with a particular familiar face (to the patient). This means that for any face that is similar to a recognizable face to the patient, the patient will recall that face as the person they know.
The Fregoli delusion is classed both as a monothematic delusion, since it only encompasses one delusional topic, and as a delusional misidentification syndrome (DMS), a class of delusional beliefs that involves misidentifying people, places, or objects. Like Capgras delusion, psychiatrists believe it is related to a breakdown in normal face perception.
Intermetamorphosis is a delusional misidentification syndrome, related to agnosia. The main symptoms consist of patients believing that they can see others change into someone else in both external appearance and internal personality. The disorder is usually comorbid with neurological disorders or mental disorders.
An example from medical literature is a man who was diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease. After some time he mistook his wife for his deceased mother and later for his sister. As an explanation, he stated that he had never been married or that his wife had left him. Later he mistook his son for his brother and his daughter for another sister. Visual agnosia or prosopagnosia were not diagnosed, as the misidentification also took place during phone calls. On several occasions he mistook the hospital for the church he used to go to.
The disorder was first described in 1932 by P. Courbon and J. Tusques ("Illusions d'intermétamorphose et de la charme"), in the Journal: Annales Medico-Psychologiques issue 14, page 401-406.
A monothematic delusion is a delusional state that concerns only one particular topic. This is contrasted by what is sometimes called "multi-thematic" or "polythematic" delusions where the person has a range of delusions (typically the case of schizophrenia). These disorders can occur within the context of schizophrenia or dementia or they can occur without any other signs of mental illness. When these disorders are found outside the context of mental illness, they are often caused by organic dysfunction as a result of traumatic brain injury, stroke, or neurological illness.
People who experience these delusions as a result of organic dysfunction often do not have any obvious intellectual deficiency nor do they have any other symptoms. Additionally, a few of these people even have some awareness that their beliefs are bizarre, yet they cannot be persuaded that their beliefs are false.
The delusions that fall under this category are:
- Capgras delusion: the belief that (usually) a close relative or spouse has been replaced by an identical-looking impostor.
- Fregoli delusion: the belief that various people whom the believer meets are actually the same person in disguise.
- Intermetamorphosis: the belief that people in one's environment swap identities with each other while maintaining the same appearance.
- Subjective doubles: a person believes there is a doppelgänger or double of him- or herself carrying out independent actions.
- Cotard delusion: the belief that oneself is dead or does not exist; sometimes coupled with the belief that one is putrefying or missing internal organs.
- Mirrored-self misidentification: the belief that one's reflection in a mirror is some other person.
- Reduplicative paramnesia: the belief that a familiar person, place, object, or body part has been duplicated. For example, a person may believe that they are, in fact, not in the hospital to which they were admitted, but in an identical-looking hospital in a different part of the country.
- Somatoparaphrenia: the delusion where one denies ownership of a limb or an entire side of one's body (often connected with stroke).
Note that some of these delusions are sometimes grouped under the umbrella term of delusional misidentification syndrome.