Despite converging agreement about the definition of persistent vegetative state, recent reports have raised concerns about the accuracy of diagnosis in some patients, and the extent to which, in a selection of cases, residual cognitive functions may remain undetected and patients are diagnosed as being in a persistent vegetative state. Objective assessment of residual cognitive function can be extremely difficult as motor responses may be minimal, inconsistent, and difficult to document in many patients, or may be undetectable in others because no cognitive output is possible (Owen et al., 2002). In recent years, a number of studies have demonstrated an important role for functional neuroimaging in the identification of residual cognitive function in persistent vegetative state; this technology is providing new insights into cerebral activity in patients with severe brain damage. Such studies, when successful, may be particularly useful where there is concern about the accuracy of the diagnosis and the possibility that residual cognitive function has remained undetected.

Misdiagnosis of PVS is not uncommon. One study of 40 patients in the United Kingdom reported that 43% of those patients classified as in a PVS were misdiagnosed and another 33% able to recover whilst the study was underway. Some cases of PVS may actually be cases of patients being in an undiagnosed minimally conscious state. Since the exact diagnostic criteria of the minimally conscious state were formulated only in 2002, there may be chronic patients diagnosed as PVS before the notion of the minimally conscious state became known.

Whether or not there is conscious awareness in vegetative state is a prominent issue. Three completely different aspects of this issue should be distinguished. First, some patients can be conscious simply because they are misdiagnosed (see above). In fact, they are not in vegetative state. Second, sometimes a patient was correctly diagnosed but is then examined during the early stages of recovery. Third, perhaps some day the very notion of the vegetative state will change so as to include elements of conscious awareness. Inability to disentangle these three cases leads to confusion. An example of such confusion is the response to a recent experiment using functional magnetic resonance imaging which revealed that a woman diagnosed with PVS was able to activate predictable portions of her brain in response to the tester's requests that she imagine herself playing tennis or moving from room to room in her house. The brain activity in response to these instructions was indistinguishable from those of healthy patients.

In 2010, Martin Monti and fellow researchers, working at the MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit at the University of Cambridge, reported in an article in the "New England Journal of Medicine" that some patients in persistent vegetative states responded to verbal instructions by displaying different patterns of brain activity on fMRI scans. Five out of a total of 54 diagnosed patients were apparently able to respond when instructed to think about one of two different physical activities. One of these five was also able to "answer" yes or no questions, again by imagining one of these two activities. It is unclear, however, whether the fact that portions of the patients' brains light up on fMRI could help these patients assume their own medical decision making.

In November 2011, a publication in "The Lancet" presented bedside EEG apparatus and indicated that its signal could be used to detect awareness in three of 16 patients diagnosed in the vegetative state.

Metabolic studies are useful, but they are not able identify neural activity within a specific region to specific cognitive processes. Functionality can only be identified at the most general level: Metabolism in cortical and subcortical regions that may contribute to cognitive processes.

At present, there is no established relation between cerebral metabolic rates of glucose or oxygen as measured by PET and patient outcome. The decrease of cerebral metabolism occurs also when patients are treated with anesthetics to the point of unresponsiveness. Lowest value (28% of normal range) have been reported during propofol anesthesia. Also deep sleep represents a phase of decreased metabolism (down to 40% of the normal range)

In general, quantitative PET studies and the assessment of cerebral metabolic rates depends on many assumptions.

PET for example requires a correction factor, the lumped constant, which is stable in healthy brains. There are reports, that a global decrease of this constant emerges after a traumatic brain injury.

But not only the correction factors change due to TBI.

Another issue is the possibility of anaerobic glycolysis that could occur after TBI. In such a case the glucose levels measured by the PET are not tightly connected to the oxygen consumption of the patient's brain.

Third point regarding PET scans is the overall measurement per unit volume of brain tissue. The imaging can be affected by the inclusion of metabolically inactive spaces e.g. cerebrospinal fluidin the case of gross hydrocephalus, which artificially lowers the calculated metabolism.

Also the issue of radiation exposure must be considered in patients with already severely damaged brains and preclude longitudinal or follow-up studies.

One of the defining characteristics of minimally conscious state is the more continuous improvement and significantly more favorable outcomes post injury when compared with vegetative state. One study looked at 100 patients with severe brain injury. At the beginning of the study, all the patients were unable to follow commands consistently or communicate reliably. These patients were diagnosed with either MCS or vegetative state based on performance on the JFK Coma Recovery Scale and the diagnostic criteria for MCS as recommended by the Aspen Consensus Conference Work-group. Both patient groups were further separated into those that suffered from traumatic brain injury and those that suffered from non-traumatic brain injures (anoxia, tumor, hydrocephalus, infection). The patients were assessed multiple times over a period of 12 months post injury using the Disability Rating Scale (DRS) which ranges from a score of 30=dead to 0=no disabilities. The results show that the DRS scores for the MCS subgroups showed the most improvement and predicted the most favorable outcomes 12 months post injury. Amongst those diagnosed with MCS, DRS scores were significantly lower for those with non-traumatic brain injuries in comparison to the vegetative state patients with traumatic brain injury. DRS scores were also significantly lower for the MCS non-traumatic brain injury group compared to the MCS traumatic brain injury group. Pairwise comparisons showed that DRS scores were significantly higher for those that suffered from non-tramuatic brain injuries than those with traumatic brain injuries. For the patients in vegetative states there were no significant differences between patients with non-traumatic brain injury and those with traumatic brain injuries. Out of the 100 patients studied, 3 patients fully recovered (had a DRS score of 0). These 3 patients were diagnosed with MCS and had suffered from traumatic brain injuries.

In summary, those with minimally conscious state and non-traumatic brain injuries will not progress as well as those with traumatic brain injuries while those in vegetative states have an all around lower to minimal chance of recovery.

Because of the major differences in prognosis described in this study, this makes it crucial that MCS be diagnosed correctly. Incorrectly diagnosing MCS as vegetative state may lead to serious repercussions related to clinical management.

While the diagnosis of brain death has become accepted as a basis for the certification of death for legal purposes, it should be clearly understood that it is a very different state from biological death - the state universally recognized and understood as death. The continuing function of vital organs in the bodies of those diagnosed brain dead, if mechanical ventilation and other life-support measures are continued, provides optimal opportunities for their transplantation.

When mechanical ventilation is used to support the body of a brain dead organ donor pending a transplant into an organ recipient, the donor's date of death is listed as the date that brain death was diagnosed.

In some countries (for instance, Spain, Finland, Poland, Wales, Portugal, and France), everyone is automatically an organ donor after diagnosis of death on legally accepted criteria, although some jurisdictions (such as Singapore, Spain, Wales, France, Czech Republic and Portugal) allow opting out of the system. Elsewhere, consent from family members or next-of-kin may be required for organ donation. In New Zealand, Australia, the United Kingdom (excluding Wales) and most states in the United States, drivers are asked upon application if they wish to be registered as an organ donor.

In the United States, if the patient is at or near death, the hospital must notify a transplant organization of the person's details and maintain the patient while the patient is being evaluated for suitability as a donor. The patient is kept on ventilator support until the organs have been surgically removed. If the patient has indicated in an advance health care directive that they do not wish to receive mechanical ventilation or has specified a do not resuscitate order and the patient has also indicated that they wish to donate their organs, some vital organs such as the heart and lungs may not be able to be recovered.

Disorders of consciousness present a variety of ethical concerns.

Most obvious is the lack of consent in any treatment decisions. Patients in PVS or MCS are not able to decide for the possibility of withdrawal of life-support. It is also a general question whether they should receive life-sustaining therapy and, if so, for how long? The problems regarding a patient's consent also account for neuroimaging studies. Without patient's consent, such studies are perceived as unethical.

Additionally only few patients have created advance directives before losing decision-making capacity.

Typically approval must be obtained from family or legal representatives depending on governmental and hospital guidelines.

But even with the consent of representatives, researchers have been refused grants, ethics committee approval and publication.

Social issues arise from the enormous costs that are caused by people with disorders of consciousness. Especially chronic comatose and vegetative patients, when recovery is highly unlikely and treatment in the ICU is considered futile by clinicians.

In addition to the aforementioned problems, the question rises why medical resources were being used not for the broader public good but for patients who seemed to have only little to gain from them.

Still research is everything but sure about the irreversibility of these conditions. Some studies demonstrated that some patients suffering from disorders of consciousness may be aware despite clinical unresponsiveness. These recent findings could have a major impact on ethical and social issues.

Although MCS patients are able to demonstrate cognitively mediated behaviors, they occur inconsistently. They are, however, reproducible or can be sustained long enough to be differentiated from reflexive behavior. Because of this inconsistency, extended assessment may be required to determine if a simple response (e.g. a finger movement or a blink) occurred because of a specific environmental event (e.g. a command to move the finger or to blink) or was merely a coincidental behavior. Distinguishing between VS and MCS is often difficult because the diagnosis is dependent on observation of behavior that show self or environmental awareness and because those behavioral responses are markedly reduced. One of the more common diagnostic errors involving disorders of consciousness is mistaking MCS for VS which may lead to serious repercussions related to clinical management.

Giacino et al. have suggested demonstration of the following behaviors in order to make the diagnosis of MCS.

- Following simple commands.

- Gestural or verbal yes/no responses (regardless of accuracy).

- Intelligible verbalization.

- Purposeful behavior such as those that are contingent due to appropriate environmental stimuli and are not reflexive. Some examples of purposeful behavior include:

- appropriate smiling or crying in response to the linguistic or visual content of emotional but not to neutral topics or stimuli.

- vocalizations or gestures that occur in direct response to the linguistic content of questions.

- reaching for objects that demonstrates a clear relationship between object location and direction of reach.

- touching or holding objects in a manner that accommodates the size and shape of the object.

- pursuit eye movement or sustained fixation that occurs in direct response to moving or salient stimuli.

It is very important for family members and health care professionals to be aware of natural movements also known as Lazarus sign or Lazarus reflex that can occur on a brain-dead person whose organs have been kept functioning by life support. The living cells that can cause these movements are not living cells from the brain or brain stem, these cells come from the spinal cord. Sometimes these body movements can cause false hope for the family members.

A brain-dead individual has no clinical evidence of brain function upon physical examination. This includes no response to pain and no cranial nerve reflexes. Reflexes include pupillary response (fixed pupils), oculocephalic reflex, corneal reflex, no response to the caloric reflex test, and no spontaneous respirations.

It is important to distinguish between brain death and states that may be difficult to differentiate from brain death, (such as barbiturate overdose, alcohol intoxication, sedative overdose, hypothermia, hypoglycemia, coma, and chronic vegetative states). Some comatose patients can recover to pre-coma or near pre-coma level of functioning, and some patients with severe irreversible neurological dysfunction will nonetheless retain some lower brain functions, such as spontaneous respiration, despite the losses of both cortex and brain stem functionality. Such is the case with anencephaly.

Note that brain electrical activity can stop completely, or drop to such a low level as to be undetectable with most equipment. An EEG will therefore be flat, though this is sometimes also observed during deep anesthesia or cardiac arrest. Although in the United States a flat EEG test is not required to certify death, it is considered to have confirmatory value. In the UK it is not considered to be of value because any continuing activity it might reveal in parts of the brain above the brain stem is held to be irrelevant to the diagnosis of death on the Code of Practice criteria.

The diagnosis of brain death needs to be rigorous, in order to be certain that the condition is irreversible. Legal criteria vary, but in general they require neurological examinations by two independent physicians. The exams must show complete and irreversible absence of brain function (brain stem function in UK), and may include two isoelectric (flat-line) EEGs 24 hours apart (less in other countries where it is accepted that if the cause of the dysfunction is a clear physical trauma there is no need to wait that long to establish irreversibility). The patient should have a normal temperature and be free of drugs that can suppress brain activity if the diagnosis is to be made on EEG criteria.

Also, a radionuclide cerebral blood flow scan that shows complete absence of intracranial blood flow must be considered with other exams – temporary swelling of the brain, particularly within the first 72 hours, can lead to a false positive test on a patient that may recover with more time.

CT angiography is neither required nor sufficient test to make the diagnosis.

Comas can last from several days to several weeks. In more severe cases a coma may last for over five weeks, while some have lasted as long as several years. After this time, some patients gradually come out of the coma, some progress to a vegetative state, and others die. Some patients who have entered a vegetative state go on to regain a degree of awareness. Others remain in a vegetative state for years or even decades (the longest recorded period being 42 years).

The outcome for coma and vegetative state depends on the cause, location, severity and extent of neurological damage. A deeper coma alone does not necessarily mean a slimmer chance of recovery, because some people in deep coma recover well while others in a so-called milder coma sometimes fail to improve.

People may emerge from a coma with a combination of physical, intellectual, and psychological difficulties that need special attention. Recovery usually occurs gradually—patients acquire more and more ability to respond. Some patients never progress beyond very basic responses, but many recover full awareness. Regaining consciousness is not instant: in the first days, patients are only awake for a few minutes, and duration of time awake gradually increases. This is unlike the situation in many movies where people who awake from comas are instantly able to continue their normal lives. In reality, the coma patient awakes sometimes in a profound state of confusion, not knowing how they got there and sometimes suffering from dysarthria, the inability to articulate any speech, and with many other disabilities.

Predicted chances of recovery are variable owing to different techniques used to measure the extent of neurological damage. All the predictions are based on statistical rates with some level of chance for recovery present: a person with a low chance of recovery may still awaken. Time is the best general predictor of a chance of recovery: after four months of coma caused by brain damage, the chance of partial recovery is less than 15%, and the chance of full recovery is very low.

The most common cause of death for a person in a vegetative state is secondary infection such as pneumonia, which can occur in patients who lie still for extended periods.

There are reports of patients coming out of coma after long periods of time. After 19 years in a minimally conscious state, Terry Wallis spontaneously began speaking and regained awareness of his surroundings.

A brain-damaged man, trapped in a coma-like state for six years, was brought back to consciousness in 2003 by doctors who planted electrodes deep inside his brain. The method, called deep brain stimulation (DBS) successfully roused communication, complex movement and eating ability in the 38-year-old American man who suffered a traumatic brain injury. His injuries left him in a minimally conscious state (MCS), a condition akin to a coma but characterized by occasional, but brief, evidence of environmental and self-awareness that coma patients lack.

Comas lasting seconds to minutes result in post-traumatic amnesia (PTA) that lasts hours to days; recovery plateau occurs over days to weeks.

Comas that last hours to days result in PTA lasting days to weeks; recovery plateau occurs over months.

Comas lasting weeks result in PTA that lasts months; recovery plateau occurs over months to years.

When diagnosing any neurological condition, history and examination are fundamental. History is obtained by family, friends or EMS. The Glasgow Coma Scale is a helpful system used to examine and determine the depth of coma, track patients progress and predict outcome as best as possible. In general a correct diagnosis can be achieved by combining findings from physical exam, imaging, and history components and directs the appropriate therapy.

DAI currently lacks a specific treatment beyond what is done for any type of head injury, including stabilizing the patient and trying to limit increases in intracranial pressure (ICP).

DAI is difficult to detect since it does not show up well on CT scans or with other macroscopic imaging techniques, though it shows up microscopically. However, there are characteristics typical of DAI that may or may not show up on a CT scan. Diffuse injury has more microscopic injury than macroscopic injury and is difficult to detect with CT and MRI, but its presence can be inferred when small bleeds are visible in the corpus callosum or the cerebral cortex. MRI is more useful than CT for detecting characteristics of diffuse axonal injury in the subacute and chronic time frames. Newer studies such as Diffusion Tensor Imaging are able to demonstrate the degree of white matter fiber tract injury even when the standard MRI is negative. Since axonal damage in DAI is largely a result of secondary biochemical cascades, it has a delayed onset, so a person with DAI who initially appears well may deteriorate later. Thus injury is frequently more severe than is realized, and medical professionals should suspect DAI in any patients whose CT scans appear normal but who have symptoms like unconsciousness.

MRI is more sensitive than CT scans, but MRI may also miss DAI, because it identifies the injury using signs of edema, which may not be present.

DAI is classified into grades based on severity of the injury. In Grade I, widespread axonal damage is present but no focal abnormalities are seen. In Grade II, damage found in Grade I is present in addition to focal abnormalities, especially in the corpus callosum. Grade III damage encompasses both Grades I and II plus rostral brain stem injury and often tears in the tissue.

Locked-in syndrome can be difficult to diagnose. In a 2002 survey of 44 LIS patients, it took almost 3 months to recognize and diagnose LIS after the patient had suffered the incident (i.e., a stroke or an injury) that had caused his/her LIS. Locked-in syndrome may mimic loss of consciousness in patients, or, in the case that respiratory control is lost, may even resemble death. Patients are also unable to actuate standard motor responses such as withdrawal from pain; as a result, testing often requires making requests of the patient such as blinking or vertical eye movement.

Brain imaging may provide additional indicators of locked-in syndrome, as brain imaging provides clues as to whether or not brain function has been lost. Additionally, an EEG can allow the observation of sleep-wake patterns indicating that the patient is not unconscious but simply unable to move.

Traumatic brain injury (TBI, physical trauma to the brain) can cause a variety of complications, health effects that are not TBI themselves but that result from it. The risk of complications increases with the severity of the trauma; however even mild traumatic brain injury can result in disabilities that interfere with social interactions, employment, and everyday living. TBI can cause a variety of problems including physical, cognitive, emotional, and behavioral complications.

Symptoms that may occur after a concussion – a minor form of traumatic brain injury – are referred to as post-concussion syndrome.

The ASCOT probability of survival encapsulates several of the variables measured in the Glasgow Coma Scale but also includes systolic blood pressure, respiration rates upon admission, and anatomic injuries. The ASCOT was found to be the most sensitive tool for determining severity of head injuries in children and is effective in predicting the outcome of injury.

The need for imaging in patients who have suffered a minor head injury is debated. A non-contrast CT of the head should be performed immediately in all those who have suffered a moderate or severe head injury, an MRI is also an option. Computed tomography (CT) has become the diagnostic modality of choice for head trauma due to its accuracy, reliability, safety, and wide availability. The changes in microcirculation, impaired auto-regulation, cerebral edema, and axonal injury start as soon as head injury occurs and manifest as clinical, biochemical, and radiological changes.

There are several different types of treatment available to those who have suffered a closed-head injury. The treatment type chosen can depend on several factors including the type and severity of injury as well as the effects that injury has on the patient.

The course of treatment differs for each patient and can include several types of treatment, depending on the patient’s specific needs.

Early treatment is vital to recovering lost motor function after an injury, but cognitive abilities can be recovered regardless of time past since injury.

It is extremely rare for any significant motor function to return. The majority of locked-in syndrome patients do not regain motor control, but devices are available to help patients communicate. However, some people with the condition continue to live much longer, while in exceptional cases, like that of Kerry Pink and Kate Allatt, a full spontaneous recovery may be achieved.

KLS can be diagnosed when there is confusion, apathy, or derealization in addition to frequent bouts of extreme tiredness and prolonged sleep. The earliest it can be diagnosed is the second episode, this is not common. The condition is generally treated as a diagnosis of exclusion. Because KLS is rare, other conditions with similar symptoms are usually considered first.

MRIs can determine if the symptoms are caused by certain brain disorders, stroke, and multiple sclerosis. Lumbar puncture can determine if encephalitis is the cause. KLS must be differentiated from substance abuse by toxicology tests. The use of Electroencephalography (EEG) can exclude temporal status epilepticus from consideration. EEGs are normal in about 70% of KLS patients, but background slowing may sometimes be detected. In addition, low-frequency high-amplitude waves can be observed during waking hours.

Initially, KLS appears similar to bipolar depression. Patients with frontal-lobe syndromes and Klüver-Bucy syndrome also display similar symptoms, but these conditions can be differentiated by the presence of brain lesions. KLS should also be distinguished from very rare cases of menstruation-caused hypersomnia.

Diagnosis is based on the self-reported experiences of the person followed by a clinical assessment. Psychiatric assessment includes a psychiatric history and some form of mental status examination. Since some medical and psychiatric conditions mimic the symptoms of DPD, clinicians must differentiate between and rule out the following to establish a precise diagnosis: temporal lobe epilepsy, panic disorder, acute stress disorder, schizophrenia, migraine, drug use, brain tumour or lesion. No laboratory test for depersonalization-derealization disorder currently exists.

The diagnosis of depersonalization disorder can be made with the use of the following interviews and scales:

The Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Dissociative Disorders (SCID-D) is widely used, especially in research settings. This interview takes about 30 minutes to 1.5 hours, depending on individual's experiences.

The Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES) is a simple, quick, self-administered questionnaire that has been widely used to measure dissociative symptoms. It has been used in hundreds of dissociative studies, and can detect depersonalization and derealization experiences.

The Dissociative Disorders Interview Schedule (DDIS) is a highly structured interview which makes DSM-IV diagnoses of somatization disorder, borderline personality disorder and major depressive disorder, as well as all the dissociative disorders. It inquires about positive symptoms of schizophrenia, secondary features of dissociative identity disorder, extrasensory experiences, substance abuse and other items relevant to the dissociative disorders. The DDIS can usually be administered in 30–45 minutes.

The Cambridge Depersonalization Scale (CDS) is a method for determining the severity of depersonalization disorder. It has been proven and accepted as a valid tool for the diagnosis of depersonalization disorder in a clinical setting. It is also used in a clinical setting to differentiate minor episodes of depersonalization from actual symptoms of the disorder. Due to the success of the CDS, a group of Japanese researchers underwent the effort to translate the CDS into the J-CDS or the Japanese Cambridge Depersonalization Scale. Through clinical trials the Japanese research team successfully tested their scale and determined its accuracy. One limitation is that the scale does not allow for the differentiation between past and present episodes of depersonalization. It should also be noted that it may be difficult for the individual to describe the duration of a depersonalization episode, and thus the scale may lack accuracy. The project was conducted in the hope that it would stimulate further scientific investigations into depersonalization disorder.

In children with uncomplicated minor head injuries the risk of intra cranial bleeding over the next year is rare at 2 cases per 1 million. In some cases transient neurological disturbances may occur, lasting minutes to hours. Malignant post traumatic cerebral swelling can develop unexpectedly in stable patients after an injury, as can post traumatic seizures. Recovery in children with neurologic deficits will vary. Children with neurologic deficits who improve daily are more likely to recover, while those who are vegetative for months are less likely to improve. Most patients without deficits have full recovery. However, persons who sustain head trauma resulting in unconsciousness for an hour or more have twice the risk of developing Alzheimer's disease later in life.

Head injury may be associated with a neck injury. Bruises on the back or neck, neck pain, or pain radiating to the arms are signs of cervical spine injury and merit spinal immobilization via application of a cervical collar and possibly a long board.If the neurological exam is normal this is reassuring. Reassessment is needed if there is a worsening headache, seizure, one sided weakness, or has persistent vomiting.

To combat overuse of Head CT Scans yielding negative intracranial hemorrhage, which unnecessarily expose patients to radiation and increase time in the hospital and cost of the visit, multiple clinical decision support rules have been developed to help clinicians weigh the option to scan a patient with a head injury. Among these are the Canadian Head CT rule, the PECARN Head Injury/Trauma Algorithm, and the New Orleans/Charity Head Injury/Trauma Rule all help clinicians make these decisions using easily obtained information and noninvasive practices.

A brainstem stroke syndrome is a condition involving a stroke of the brainstem. Because of their location, they often involve impairment both of the cranial nuclei and of the long tracts.

A person may have vertigo, dizziness and severe imbalance without the hallmark of most strokes – weakness on one side of the body. The symptoms of vertigo, dizziness or imbalance usually occur together; dizziness alone is not a sign of stroke. Brainstem stroke can also cause diplopia, slurred speech and decreased level of consciousness. A more serious outcome is locked-in syndrome.

Mild and moderate cerebral hypoxia generally has no impact beyond the episode of hypoxia; on the other hand, the outcome of severe cerebral hypoxia will depend on the success of damage control, amount of brain tissue deprived of oxygen, and the speed with which oxygen was restored.

If cerebral hypoxia was localized to a specific part of the brain, brain damage will be localized to that region. A general consequence may be epilepsy. The long-term effects will depend on the purpose of that portion of the brain. Damage to the Broca's area and the Wernicke's area of the brain (left side) typically causes problems with speech and language. Damage to the right side of the brain may interfere with the ability to express emotions or interpret what one sees. Damage on either side can cause paralysis of the opposite side of the body.

The effects of certain kinds of severe generalized hypoxias may take time to develop. For example, the long-term effects of serious carbon monoxide poisoning usually may take several weeks to appear. Recent research suggests this may be due to an autoimmune response caused by carbon monoxide-induced changes in the myelin sheath surrounding neurons.

If hypoxia results in coma, the length of unconsciousness is often indicative of long-term damage. In some cases coma can give the brain an opportunity to heal and regenerate, but, in general, the longer a coma, the greater the likelihood that the person will remain in a vegetative state until death. Even if the patient wakes up, brain damage is likely to be significant enough to prevent a return to normal functioning.

Long-term comas can have a significant impact on a patient's families. Families of coma victims often have idealized images of the outcome based on Hollywood movie depictions of coma. Adjusting to the realities of ventilators, feeding tubes, bedsores, and muscle wasting may be difficult. Treatment decision often involve complex ethical choices and can strain family dynamics.

Depersonalization disorder is classified differently in the DSM-IV-TR and in the ICD-10: In the DSM-IV-TR this disorder it is seen as a dissociative disorder; in the ICD-10 as an independent neurotic disorder. Whether depersonalization disorder should be characterized as a dissociative disorder can be discussed.

Lithium is the only drug that appears to have a preventive effect. In two studies of more than 100 patients, lithium helped prevent recurrence of symptoms in 20% to 40% of cases. The recommended blood level of lithium for KLS patients is 0.8-1.2 mEq/ml. It is not known if other mood stabilizers have an effect on the condition. Anti-depressants do not prevent recurrence.