Because it is a rare and poorly understood condition, there is no definitive way to diagnose the Capgras delusion. Diagnosis is primarily made on psychological evaluation of the patient, who is most likely brought to a psychologist's attention by a family member or friend believed to be an imposter by the person under the delusion.

Once it has been positively identified, pharmacotherapy follows. Antipsychotic drugs are the frontrunners in treatment for Fregoli and other DMSs. In addition to antipsychotics, anticonvulsants and antidepressants are also prescribed in some treatment courses. If a Fregoli patient has other psychological disorders, treatment often results in the use of trifluoperazine.

Individual therapy may be best suited to treat the individual's delusions. Persistence is needed in establishing a therapeutic empathy without validating the patient’s delusional system or overtly confronting the system. Cognitive techniques that include reality testing and reframing can be used. Antipsychotics and other therapeutic drugs have been used with relative success.

According to the DSM-5 (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th Edition), Cotard delusion falls under the category of somatic delusions, those that involve bodily functions or sensations. (Citation needed. DSM-5 does not specifically reference Cotard syndrome.)

There are no further diagnostic criteria for Cotard syndrome within the DSM-5, and identification of the syndrome relies heavily on clinical interpretation.

Cotard delusion should not be confused with Delusional Disorders as defined by the DSM-5, which involve a different spectrum of symptoms that are less severe and have lesser detrimental effect on functioning.

Confabulations can also be detected using a free recall task, such as a self-narrative task. Participants are asked to recall stories (semantic or autobiographical) that are highly familiar to them. The stories recalled are encoded for errors that could be classified as distortions in memory. Distortions could include falsifying true story elements or including details from a completely different story. Errors such as these would be indicative of confabulations.

Confabulations can also be researched by using continuous recognition tasks. These tasks are often used in conjunction with confidence ratings. Generally, in a recognition task, participants are rapidly presented with pictures. Some of these pictures are shown once; others are shown multiple times. Participants press a key if they have seen the picture previously. Following a period of time, participants repeat the task. More errors on the second task, versus the first, are indicative of confusion, representing false memories.

The Fregoli delusion, or the delusion of doubles, is a rare disorder in which a person holds a delusional belief that different people are in fact a single person who changes appearance or is in disguise. The syndrome may be related to a brain lesion and is often of a paranoid nature, with the delusional person believing themselves persecuted by the person they believe is in disguise.

A person with the Fregoli delusion can also inaccurately recall places, objects, and events. This disorder can be explained by "associative nodes". The associative nodes serve as a biological link of information about other people with a particular familiar face (to the patient). This means that for any face that is similar to a recognizable face to the patient, the patient will recall that face as the person they know.

The Fregoli delusion is classed both as a monothematic delusion, since it only encompasses one delusional topic, and as a delusional misidentification syndrome (DMS), a class of delusional beliefs that involves misidentifying people, places, or objects. Like Capgras delusion, psychiatrists believe it is related to a breakdown in normal face perception.

Differential diagnosis includes ruling out other causes such as drug-induced conditions, dementia, infections, metabolic disorders, and endocrine disorders. Other psychiatric disorders must then be ruled out. In delusional disorder, mood symptoms tend to be brief or absent, and unlike schizophrenia, delusions are non-bizarre and hallucinations are minimal or absent.

Interviews are important tools to obtain information about the patient's life situation and past history to help make a diagnosis. Clinicians generally review earlier medical records to gather a full history. Clinicians also try to interview the patient's immediate family, as this can be helpful in determining the presence of delusions. The mental status examination is used to assess the patient's current mental condition.

A psychological questionnaire used in the diagnosis of the delusional disorder is the Peters Delusion Inventory (PDI) which focuses on identifying and understanding delusional thinking. However, this questionnaire is more likely used in research than in clinical practice.

In terms of diagnosing a non-bizarre delusion as a delusion, ample support should be provided through fact checking. In case of non-bizarre delusions, Psych Central notes, "All of these situations could be true or possible, but the person suffering from this disorder knows them not to be (e.g., through fact-checking, third-person confirmation, etc.)."

A widely accepted treatment for the syndrome of subjective doubles has not been developed. Treatment methods for this disease sometimes include the prescription of antipsychotic drugs, however, the type of drug prescribed depends on the presence of other mental disorders. Antipsychotic drugs (also known as neuroleptics) such as risperidone, pimozide, or haloperidol may be prescribed to treat the underlying psychiatric illness.

In addition to drug therapy, interpersonal counseling has also been suggested as a method to ease relations between the patient and his/her suspected doubles. However, the relationship between the patient and his/her double is not always negative.

The Gudjonsson Compliance Scale is a self-report instrument that measures peoples' levels of compliance. It focuses on two types of behavior, namely eagerness to please others, and avoidance of conflicts. The scale consists of 20 items using

a true/false format. Examples are 'I give in easily to people when I am pressured' and 'I try hard to do what is expected of me'. After recoding items 17 to 19, a total GCS score varying from 0 to 20 can be obtained by summing the number of true responses, with higher scores indexing more compliant behavior.

Serotonin and norepinephrine reuptake inhibitor, venlafaxine, were given to case study KS four months after initial stroke that started symptoms of witzelsucht. Changes back to his original behavior were noticeable after daily dose of 37.5 mg of venlafaxine for two weeks. In subsequent two months, inappropriate jokes and hypersexual behavior were rarely noticed. Due to the rareness of this disorder, not much research into potential treatments has been conducted.

Recovery from this syndrome is situational, as some drug therapies have been effective in some individuals but not others. Patients may live in a variety of settings, including psychiatric hospitals, depending on the success of treatment. With successful treatment, an individual may live at home. In many of the reported cases, remission of symptoms occurred during the follow-up period.

This disorder can be dangerous to the patient and others, as a patient may interrogate or attack a person they believe to be a double. Inappropriate behavior such as stalking and physical or psychological abuse has been documented in some case studies. Consequently, many individuals suffering from this disorder are arrested for the resulting misconduct (see the case of Mr. B in #Presentation).

The modern definition and Jaspers' original criteria have been criticised, as counter-examples can be shown for every defining feature.

Studies on psychiatric patients show that delusions vary in intensity and conviction over time, which suggests that certainty and incorrigibility are not necessary components of a delusional belief.

Delusions do not necessarily have to be false or 'incorrect inferences about external reality'. Some religious or spiritual beliefs by their nature may not be falsifiable, and hence cannot be described as false or incorrect, no matter whether the person holding these beliefs was diagnosed as delusional or not.

In other situations the delusion may turn out to be true belief. For example, in delusional jealousy, where a person believes that their partner is being unfaithful (and may even follow them into the bathroom believing them to be seeing their lover even during the briefest of partings), it may actually be true that the partner is having sexual relations with another person. In this case, the delusion does not cease to be a delusion because the content later turns out to be verified as true or the partner actually chose to engage in the behavior of which they were being accused.

In other cases, the delusion may be assumed to be false by a doctor or psychiatrist assessing the belief, because it "seems" to be unlikely, bizarre or held with excessive conviction. Psychiatrists rarely have the time or resources to check the validity of a person’s claims leading to some true beliefs to be erroneously classified as delusional. This is known as the Martha Mitchell effect, after the wife of the attorney general who alleged that illegal activity was taking place in the White House. At the time, her claims were thought to be signs of mental illness, and only after the Watergate scandal broke was she proved right (and hence sane).

Similar factors have led to criticisms of Jaspers' definition of true delusions as being ultimately 'un-understandable'. Critics (such as R. D. Laing) have argued that this leads to the diagnosis of delusions being based on the subjective understanding of a particular psychiatrist, who may not have access to all the information that might make a belief otherwise interpretable. R. D. Laing's hypothesis has been applied to some forms of projective therapy to "fix" a delusional system so that it cannot be altered by the patient. Psychiatric researchers at Yale University, Ohio State University and the Community Mental Health Center of Middle Georgia have used novels and motion picture films as the focus. Texts, plots and cinematography are discussed and the delusions approached tangentially. This use of fiction to decrease the malleability of a delusion was employed in a joint project by science-fiction author Philip Jose Farmer and Yale psychiatrist A. James Giannini. They wrote the novel "Red Orc's Rage", which, recursively, deals with delusional adolescents who are treated with a form of projective therapy. In this novel's fictional setting other novels written by Farmer are discussed and the characters are symbolically integrated into the delusions of fictional patients. This particular novel was then applied to real-life clinical settings.

Another difficulty with the diagnosis of delusions is that almost all of these features can be found in "normal" beliefs. Many religious beliefs hold exactly the same features, yet are not universally considered delusional. These factors have led the psychiatrist Anthony David to note that "there is no acceptable (rather than accepted) definition of a delusion." In practice, psychiatrists tend to diagnose a belief as delusional if it is either patently bizarre, causing significant distress, or excessively pre-occupying the patient, especially if the person is subsequently unswayed in belief by counter-evidence or reasonable arguments.

It is important to distinguish true delusions from other symptoms such as anxiety, fear, or paranoia. To diagnose delusions a mental state examination may be used. This test includes appearance, mood, affect, behavior, rate and continuity of speech, evidence of hallucinations or abnormal beliefs, thought content, orientation to time, place and person, attention and concentration, insight and judgment, as well as short-term memory.

Johnson-Laird suggests that delusions may be viewed as the natural consequence of failure to distinguish conceptual relevance. That is, the person takes irrelevant information and puts it in the form of disconnected experiences, then it is taken to be relevant in a manner that suggests false causal connections. Furthermore, the person takes the relevant information, in the form of counterexamples, and ignores it.

Some critical psychiatrists criticize the practice of defining one and the same belief as normal in one culture and pathological in another culture for cultural essentialism. They argue that since cultural influences are mixed, including not only parents and teachers but also peers, friends, books and the internet, and the same cultural influence can have different effects depending on earlier cultural influences, the assumption that culture can be boiled down to a few traceable, distinguishable and statistically quantifiable factors and that everything that does not fall in those factors must be biological, is not a justified assumption. Other critical psychiatrists argue that just because a person's belief is unshaken by one influence does not prove that it would remain unshaken by another. For example, a person whose beliefs are not changed by verbal correction from a psychiatrist, which is how delusion is usually diagnosed, may still change his or her mind when observing empirical evidence, only that psychiatry rarely if ever present patients with such situations.

The article "Cotard's syndrome: A Review" (2010) reports successful pharmacological treatments (mono-therapeutic and multi-therapeutic) using antidepressant, antipsychotic, and mood stabilizing drugs; likewise, with the depressed patient, electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) is more effective than pharmacotherapy. Cotard syndrome resulting from an adverse drug reaction to valacyclovir is attributed to elevated serum concentration of one of valacyclovir's metabolites, 9-carboxymethoxymethylguanine (CMMG). Successful treatment warrants cessation of the drug, valacyclovir. Hemodialysis was associated with timely clearance of CMMG and resolution of symptoms.

A monothematic delusion is a delusional state that concerns only one particular topic. This is contrasted by what is sometimes called "multi-thematic" or "polythematic" delusions where the person has a range of delusions (typically the case of schizophrenia). These disorders can occur within the context of schizophrenia or dementia or they can occur without any other signs of mental illness. When these disorders are found outside the context of mental illness, they are often caused by organic dysfunction as a result of traumatic brain injury, stroke, or neurological illness.

People who experience these delusions as a result of organic dysfunction often do not have any obvious intellectual deficiency nor do they have any other symptoms. Additionally, a few of these people even have some awareness that their beliefs are bizarre, yet they cannot be persuaded that their beliefs are false.

The Gudjonsson suggestibility scale (GSS) is used to measure interrogative suggestibility. The GSS consists of a story that is read out loud by a test administer. Participants then have to answer 20 questions of which 15 are misleading and 5 are neutral and address factual details of the story. After participants have answered the questions, they receive negative feedback about their performance. They are asked to answer the questions one more time and to be more accurate this time. Thus, all questions are answered twice and in this way several GSS parameters can be calculated. First, yield 1 refers to the number of misleading questions that the participant accepts during the first round (range 0–15). Second, yield 2 refers to the number of misleading questions accepted during the second round (range 0–15). Third, shift refers to the number of changes that participants make in their answers after having received negative feedback (range 0–20). Finally, the total GSS score is the sum of yield 1 and shift, with higher scores reflecting higher levels of interrogative suggestibility (range 0–35).

The delusions that fall under this category are:

- Capgras delusion: the belief that (usually) a close relative or spouse has been replaced by an identical-looking impostor.

- Fregoli delusion: the belief that various people whom the believer meets are actually the same person in disguise.

- Intermetamorphosis: the belief that people in one's environment swap identities with each other while maintaining the same appearance.

- Subjective doubles: a person believes there is a doppelgänger or double of him- or herself carrying out independent actions.

- Cotard delusion: the belief that oneself is dead or does not exist; sometimes coupled with the belief that one is putrefying or missing internal organs.

- Mirrored-self misidentification: the belief that one's reflection in a mirror is some other person.

- Reduplicative paramnesia: the belief that a familiar person, place, object, or body part has been duplicated. For example, a person may believe that they are, in fact, not in the hospital to which they were admitted, but in an identical-looking hospital in a different part of the country.

- Somatoparaphrenia: the delusion where one denies ownership of a limb or an entire side of one's body (often connected with stroke).

Note that some of these delusions are sometimes grouped under the umbrella term of delusional misidentification syndrome.

Witzelsucht (from the German "witzeln", meaning to joke or wisecrack, and "sucht", meaning addiction or yearning) is a set of rare neurological symptoms characterized by a tendency to make puns, or tell inappropriate jokes or pointless stories in socially inappropriate situations. A less common symptom is hypersexuality, the tendency to make sexual comments at inappropriate times or situations. Patients do not understand that their behavior is abnormal, therefore are nonresponsive to others' reactions. This disorder is most commonly seen in patients with frontal lobe damage, particularly right frontal lobe tumors or trauma. The disorder remains named in accordance with its reviewed definition by German neurologist Hermann Oppenheim; its first description as the less focused "Moria" ("stupidity"), by German neurologist Moritz Jastrowitz, was in 1888.

Due to similarity of symptoms of the disorder to the mannerisms of Batman's arch-rival Joker, it is sometimes known as 'The Joker Syndrome'

Delusional misidentification syndrome is an umbrella term, introduced by Christodoulou (in his book "The Delusional Misidentification Syndromes", Karger, Basel, 1986) for a group of delusional disorders that occur in the context of mental and neurological illness. They all involve a belief that the identity of a person, object, or place has somehow changed or has been altered. As these delusions typically only concern one particular topic, they also fall under the category called monothematic delusions.

This psychopathological syndrome is usually considered to include four main variants:

- The Capgras delusion is the belief that (usually) a close relative or spouse has been replaced by an identical-looking impostor.

- The Fregoli delusion is the belief that various people the believer meets are actually the same person in disguise.

- Intermetamorphosis is the belief that people in the environment swap identities with each other whilst maintaining the same appearance.

- Subjective doubles, described by Christodoulou in 1978 ("American Journal of Psychiatry" 135, 249, 1978), is the belief that there is a doppelgänger or double of him- or herself carrying out independent actions.

However, similar delusional beliefs, often singularly or more rarely reported, are sometimes also considered to be part of the delusional misidentification syndrome. For example:

- Mirrored-self misidentification is the belief that one's reflection in a mirror is some other person.

- Reduplicative paramnesia is the belief that a familiar person, place, object, or body part has been duplicated. For example, a person may believe that they are in fact not in the hospital to which they were admitted, but an identical-looking hospital in a different part of the country, despite this being obviously false.

- The Cotard delusion is a rare disorder in which people hold a delusional belief that they are dead (either figuratively or literally), do not exist, are putrefying, or have lost their blood or internal organs. In rare instances, it can include delusions of immortality.

- Syndrome of delusional companions is the belief that objects (such as soft toys) are sentient beings.

- Clonal pluralization of the self, where a person believes there are multiple copies of him- or herself, identical both physically and psychologically but physically separate and distinct.

There is considerable evidence that disorders such as the Capgras or Fregoli syndromes are associated with disorders of face perception and recognition. However, it has been suggested that all misidentification problems exist on a continuum of anomalies of familiarity, from déjà vu at one end to the formation of delusional beliefs at the other.

Treatment of any kind of complex visual hallucination requires an understanding of the different pathologies in order to correctly diagnose and treat. If a person is taking a pro-hallucinogenic medication, the first step is to stop taking it. Sometimes improvement will occur spontaneously and pharmacotherapy is not necessary. While there is not a lot of evidence of effective pharmacological treatment, antipsychotics and anticonvulsants have been used in some cases to control hallucinations. Since peduncular hallucinosis occurs due to an excess of serotonin, modern antipsychotics are used to block both dopamine and serotonin receptors, preventing the overstimulation of the lateral geniculate nucleus. The drug generically called carbamazepine increases GABA, which prevents the LGN from firing, thereby increasing the inhibition of the LGN. Regular antipsychotics as well as antidepressants can also be helpful in reducing or eliminating peduncular hallucinosis.

More invasive treatments include corrective surgery such as cataract surgery, laser photocoagulation of the retina, and use of optical correcting devices. Tumor removal can also help to relieve compression in the brain, which can decrease or eliminate peduncular hallucinosis. Some hallucinations may be due to underlying cardiovascular disease, so in these cases the appropriate treatment includes control of hypertension and diabetes. As described, the type of treatment varies widely depending on the causation behind the complex visual hallucinations.

Diagnosis is based on the self-reported experiences of the person followed by a clinical assessment. Psychiatric assessment includes a psychiatric history and some form of mental status examination. Since some medical and psychiatric conditions mimic the symptoms of DPD, clinicians must differentiate between and rule out the following to establish a precise diagnosis: temporal lobe epilepsy, panic disorder, acute stress disorder, schizophrenia, migraine, drug use, brain tumour or lesion. No laboratory test for depersonalization-derealization disorder currently exists.

The diagnosis of depersonalization disorder can be made with the use of the following interviews and scales:

The Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Dissociative Disorders (SCID-D) is widely used, especially in research settings. This interview takes about 30 minutes to 1.5 hours, depending on individual's experiences.

The Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES) is a simple, quick, self-administered questionnaire that has been widely used to measure dissociative symptoms. It has been used in hundreds of dissociative studies, and can detect depersonalization and derealization experiences.

The Dissociative Disorders Interview Schedule (DDIS) is a highly structured interview which makes DSM-IV diagnoses of somatization disorder, borderline personality disorder and major depressive disorder, as well as all the dissociative disorders. It inquires about positive symptoms of schizophrenia, secondary features of dissociative identity disorder, extrasensory experiences, substance abuse and other items relevant to the dissociative disorders. The DDIS can usually be administered in 30–45 minutes.

The Cambridge Depersonalization Scale (CDS) is a method for determining the severity of depersonalization disorder. It has been proven and accepted as a valid tool for the diagnosis of depersonalization disorder in a clinical setting. It is also used in a clinical setting to differentiate minor episodes of depersonalization from actual symptoms of the disorder. Due to the success of the CDS, a group of Japanese researchers underwent the effort to translate the CDS into the J-CDS or the Japanese Cambridge Depersonalization Scale. Through clinical trials the Japanese research team successfully tested their scale and determined its accuracy. One limitation is that the scale does not allow for the differentiation between past and present episodes of depersonalization. It should also be noted that it may be difficult for the individual to describe the duration of a depersonalization episode, and thus the scale may lack accuracy. The project was conducted in the hope that it would stimulate further scientific investigations into depersonalization disorder.

In ICD-10, this disorder is called depersonalization-derealization syndrome F48.1. The diagnostic criteria are as follows:

The diagnosis should not be given in certain specified conditions, for instance when intoxicated by alcohol or drugs, or together with schizophrenia, mood disorders and anxiety disorders.

Chronic hallucinatory psychosis is a psychosis subtype, classified under "Other nonorganic psychosis" by the . Other abnormal mental symptoms in the early stages are, as a rule, absent. The patient is most usually quiet and orderly, with a good memory.

It has often been a matter of the greatest difficulty to decide under which heading of the recognized classifications individual members of this group should be placed. As the hallucinations give rise to slight depression, some might possibly be included under melancholia. In others, paranoia may develop. Others, again, might be swept into the widespread net of dementia praecox. This state of affairs cannot be regarded as satisfactory, for they are not truly cases of melancholia, paranoia, dementia praecox or any other described affection.

This disease, as its name suggests, is a hallucinatory case, for it is its main feature. These may be of all senses, but auditory hallucinations are the most prominent. At the beginning, the patient may realize that the hallucination is a morbid phenomenon and unaccountable. They may claim to hear a "voice" speaking, though there is no one in the flesh actually doing so. Such a state of affairs may last for years and possibly, though rarely, for life, and the subject would not be deemed insane in the ordinary sense of the word.

It's probable, however, that this condition forms the first stage of the illness, which eventually develops on definite lines. What usually happens is the patient seeks an explanation for the hallucinations. As none is forthcoming he/she tries to account for their presence and the result is a delusion, and, most frequently, a delusion of persecution. Also, it needs to be noted that the delusion is a comparatively late arrival and is the logical result of the hallucinations.

Historically, misdiagnosis rates have been high due to the complex nature of the disorder although some research now indicates that misdiagnosis may be reducing.