Boanthropy is a psychological disorder in which a human believes himself or herself to be a bovine.

The Truman Show delusion, informally known as Truman syndrome, is a type of delusion in which the person believes that their lives are staged reality shows, or that they are being watched on cameras. The term was coined in 2008 by brothers Joel Gold and Ian Gold, a psychiatrist and a neurophilosopher, respectively, after the film "The Truman Show".

The Truman Show delusion is not officially recognized nor listed in the "Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association".

Folie à deux (; ; French for "madness of two"), or shared psychosis, is a psychiatric syndrome in which symptoms of a delusional belief and sometimes hallucinations are transmitted from one individual to another. The same syndrome shared by more than two people may be called "folie à trois", "folie à quatre", "folie en famille" ("family madness"), or even "folie à plusieurs" ("madness of many").

Recent psychiatric classifications refer to the syndrome as shared psychotic disorder (DSM-IV – 297.3) and induced delusional disorder (F24) in the ICD-10, although the research literature largely uses the original name. This disorder is not in the current DSM (DSM-5). The disorder was first conceptualized in 19th-century French psychiatry by Charles Lasègue and Jean-Pierre Falret and is also known as Lasègue-Falret syndrome.

Ideas of reference and delusions of reference describe the phenomenon of an individual's experiencing innocuous events or mere coincidences and believing they have strong personal significance. It is "the notion that everything one perceives in the world relates to one's own destiny".

In psychiatry, delusions of reference form part of the diagnostic criteria for psychotic illnesses such as schizophrenia, delusional disorder, bipolar disorder (during the elevated stages of mania), as well as schizotypal personality disorder. To a lesser extent, it can be a hallmark of paranoid personality disorder. Such symptoms can also be caused by intoxication, especially with hallucinogens or stimulants like methamphetamine.

Social circumstances appear to be highly influential on paranoid beliefs. Based on data collected by means of a mental health survey distributed to residents of Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua (in Mexico) and El Paso, Texas (in the United States), paranoid beliefs seem to be associated with feelings of powerlessness and victimization, enhanced by social situations. Potential causes of these effects included a sense of believing in external control, and mistrust which can be strengthened by lower socioeconomic status. Those living in a lower socioeconomic status may feel less in control of their own lives. In addition, this study explains that females have the tendency to believe in external control at a higher rate than males, potentially making females more susceptible to mistrust and the effects of socioeconomic status on paranoia.

Emanuel Messinger reports that surveys have revealed that those exhibiting paranoia can evolve from parental relationships and dis-trustworthy environments. These environments could include being very disciplinary, stringent, and unstable. It was even noted that, "indulging and pampering (thereby impressing the child that he is something special and warrants special privileges)," can be contributing backgrounds. Experiences likely to enhance or manifest the symptoms of paranoia include increased rates of disappointment, stress, and a hopeless state of mind.

Discrimination has also been reported as a potential predictor of paranoid delusions. Such reports that paranoia seemed to appear more in older patients who had experienced higher levels of discrimination throughout their lives. In addition to this it has been noted that immigrants are quite susceptible to forms of psychosis. This could be due to the aforementioned effects of discriminatory events and humiliation.

Explaining the causes of delusions continues to be challenging and several theories have been developed. One is the genetic or biological theory, which states that close relatives of people with delusional disorder are at increased risk of delusional traits. Another theory is the dysfunctional cognitive processing, which states that delusions may arise from distorted ways people have of explaining life to themselves. A third theory is called motivated or defensive delusions. This one states that some of those persons who are predisposed might suffer the onset of delusional disorder in those moments when coping with life and maintaining high self-esteem becomes a significant challenge. In this case, the person views others as the cause of their personal difficulties in order to preserve a positive self-view.

This condition is more common among people who have poor hearing or sight. Also, ongoing stressors have been associated with a higher possibility of developing delusions. Examples of such stressors are immigration, low socioeconomic status, and even possibly the accumulation of smaller daily hassles.

The glass delusion is an external manifestation of a psychiatric disorder recorded in Europe mainly in the late Middle Ages and early modern period (15th to 17th centuries). People feared that they were made of glass "and therefore likely to shatter into pieces". One famous early sufferer was King Charles VI of France who refused to allow people to touch him, and wore reinforced clothing to protect himself from accidental "shattering".

One important factor may be differences or changes in parts of the brain known to be involved in representing body shape (e.g., see proprioception and body image). A neuroimaging study of two people diagnosed with clinical lycanthropy showed that these areas display unusual activation, suggesting that when people report their bodies are changing shape, they may be genuinely perceiving those feelings.

This syndrome is most commonly diagnosed when the two or more individuals concerned live in proximity and may be socially or physically isolated and have little interaction with other people. Various sub-classifications of "folie à deux" have been proposed to describe how the delusional belief comes to be held by more than one person :

- Folie imposée is where a dominant person (known as the 'primary', 'inducer' or 'principal') initially forms a delusional belief during a psychotic episode and imposes it on another person or persons (known as the 'secondary', 'acceptor' or 'associate') with the assumption that the secondary person might not have become deluded if left to his or her own devices. If the parties are admitted to hospital separately, then the delusions in the person with the induced beliefs usually resolve without the need of medication.

- Folie simultanée describes either the situation where two people considered to suffer independently from psychosis influence the content of each other's delusions so they become identical or strikingly similar, or one in which two people "morbidly predisposed" to delusional psychosis mutually trigger symptoms in each other.

Folie à deux and its more populous cousins are in many ways a psychiatric curiosity. The current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders states that a person cannot be diagnosed as being delusional if the belief in question is one "ordinarily accepted by other members of the person's culture or subculture" (see entry for delusion). It is not clear at what point a belief considered to be delusional escapes from the "folie à..." diagnostic category and becomes legitimate because of the number of people holding it. When a large number of people may come to believe obviously false and potentially distressing things based purely on hearsay, these beliefs are not considered to be clinical delusions by the psychiatric profession and are labelled instead as mass hysteria.

A religious delusion is any delusion involving religious themes or subject matter. Though a small minority of psychologists have characterized all or nearly all religion as delusion, others focus solely on a denial of any spiritual cause of symptoms exhibited by a patient and look for other answers relating to a chemical imbalance in the brain, although there is actually no evidence of pathology in any psychiatric illness which means a diagnosis is made purely on opinions of professionals based on symptoms the person exhibits.

Paranoia is an instinct or thought process believed to be heavily influenced by anxiety or fear, often to the point of delusion and irrationality. Paranoid thinking typically includes persecutory, or beliefs of concerning a perceived threat towards oneself (e.g. ""Everyone is out to get me"", which is an American parochial phrase). Paranoia is distinct from phobias, which also involve irrational fear, but usually no blame. Making false accusations and the general distrust of others also frequently accompany paranoia. For example, an incident most people would view as an accident or coincidence, a paranoid person might believe was intentional. Paranoia is a central symptom of psychosis. It is also a matter of personal tolerance for the individual that might be in conflict with psychiatric diagnoses.

In rare cases, individuals may believe that other people have transformed into animals. This has been termed "lycanthropic intermetamorphosis" and "lycanthropy spectrum". A 2009 study reported that, after the consumption of the drug MDMA (Ecstasy), a man displayed symptoms of paranoid psychosis by claiming that his relatives had changed into various animals such as a boar, a donkey and a horse.

Examples from a 295-subject study in Lithuania showed that the most common religious delusions were being a saint (in women) and being God (in men).

In one study of 193 people who had previously been admitted to hospital and subsequently diagnosed with schizophrenia, 24% were found to have religious delusions.

A 1999 study identified that religious delusions were often present or expressed in persons with forensic committal to a psychiatric unit.

A delusion is a mistaken belief that is held with strong conviction even when presented with superior evidence to the contrary. As a pathology, it is distinct from a belief based on false or incomplete information, confabulation, dogma, illusion, or some other misleading effects of perception.

Delusions typically occur in the context of neurological or psychiatric disease, although they are not tied to any particular disorder and have been found to occur in the context of many pathological states (both physical and mental). However, they are of particular diagnostic importance in psychotic disorders including schizophrenia, paraphrenia, manic episodes of bipolar disorder, and psychotic depression.

A fixed fantasy — also known as a "dysfunctional schema" — is a belief or system of beliefs held by a single individual to be genuine, but that cannot be verified in reality. The term is typically applied to individuals suffering from some type of psychiatric dysregulation, most often a personality disorder.

The term is also used in the different context of psychoanalysis to distinguish between 'a normal transitory one and a fixed fantasy' with respect to the phantasised 'fulfilment in conscious or unconscious thought of the sexualised wish'.

Concentration of the glass delusion among the wealthy and educated classes allowed modern scholars to associate it with a wider and better described disorder of scholar's melancholy.

Delusional disorders are uncommon in psychiatric practice, though this may be an underestimation due to the fact that those afflicted lack insight and thus avoid psychiatric assessment. The prevalence of this condition stands at about 24 to 30 cases per 100,000 people while 0.7 to 3.0 new cases per 100,000 people are reported every year. Delusional disorder accounts for 1–2% of admissions to inpatient mental health facilities. The incidence of first admissions for delusional disorder is lower, from 0.001–0.003%.

Delusional disorder tends to appear in middle to late adult life, and for the most part first admissions to hospital for delusional disorder occur between age 33 and 55. It is more common in women than men, and immigrants seem to be at higher risk.

The article "Betwixt Life and Death: Case Studies of the Cotard Delusion" (1996) describes a contemporary case of Cotard delusion, which occurred in a Scotsman whose brain was damaged in a motorcycle accident:

The article "Recurrent Postictal Depression with Cotard Delusion" (2005) describes the case of a fourteen-year-old epileptic boy whose distorted perception of reality resulted from Cotard syndrome. His mental health history was of a boy expressing themes of death, chronic sadness, decreased physical activity in playtime, social withdrawal, and disturbed biological functions. About twice a year, the boy suffered episodes that lasted between three weeks and three months. In the course of each episode, he said that everyone and everything was dead (including trees), described himself as a dead body, and warned that the world would be destroyed within hours. Throughout the episode, the boy showed no response to pleasurable stimuli and had no interest in social activities.

Erotomania is a type of delusional disorder where the affected person believes that another person is in love with him or her. This belief is usually applied to someone with higher status or a famous person, but can also be applied to a complete stranger. Erotomanic delusions often occur in patients with schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders, but can also occur during a manic episode in the context of bipolar I disorder. During an erotomanic delusion, the patient believes that a secret admirer is declaring his or her affection for the patient, often by special glances, signals, telepathy, or messages through the media. Usually the patient then returns the perceived affection by means of letters, phone calls, gifts, and visits to the unwitting recipient. Even though these advances are unexpected and often unwanted, any denial of affection by the object of this delusional love is dismissed by the patient as a ploy to conceal the forbidden love from the rest of the world.

Erotomania is also called de Clérambault's syndrome, after French psychiatrist Gaëtan Gatian de Clérambault (1872–1934), who published a comprehensive review paper on the subject ("Les Psychoses Passionnelles") in 1921. Erotomania should not be confused with obsessive love or obsession with unrequited love, neither of which involves delusion.

Current cognitive neuropsychology research points toward a two-factor approach to the cause of monothematic delusions. The first factor being the anomalous experience—often a neurological defect—which leads to the delusion, and the second factor being an impairment of the belief formation cognitive process.

As an example of one of these first factors, several studies point toward Capgras delusion being the result of a disorder of the affect component of face perception. As a result, while the person can recognize their spouse (or other close relation) they do not feel the typical emotional reaction, and thus the spouse does not seem like the person they once knew.

As studies have shown, these neurological defects are not enough on their own to cause delusional thinking. An additional second factor—a bias or impairment of the belief formation cognitive process—is required to solidify and maintain the delusion. Since we do not currently have a solid cognitive model of the belief formation process, this second factor is still somewhat of an unknown.

Some research has shown that delusional people are more prone to jumping to conclusions, and thus they would be more likely to take their anomalous experience as veridical and make snap judgments based on these experiences. Additionally, studies have shown that they are more prone to making errors due to matching bias—indicative of a tendency to try and confirm the rule. These two judgment biases help explain how delusion-prone people could grasp onto extreme delusions and be very resistant to change.

Researchers claim this is enough to explain the delusional thinking. However, other researchers still argue that these biases are not enough to explain why they remain completely impervious to evidence over time. They believe that there must be some additional unknown neurological defect in the patient's belief system (probably in the right hemisphere).

In researching over 1000 individuals of vast range of backgrounds, Stompe and colleagues (2006) found that grandiosity remains as the second most common delusion after persecutory delusions. A variation in the occurrence of grandiosity delusions in schizophrenic patients across cultures has also been observed. In research done by Appelbaum "et al." it has been found that GDs appeared more commonly in patients with bipolar disorder (59%) than in patients with schizophrenia (49%), followed by presence in substance misuse disorder patients (30%) and depressed patients (21%).

A relationship has been claimed between the age of onset of bipolar disorder and the occurrence of GDs. According to Carlson "et al." (2000), grandiose delusions appeared in 74% of the patients who were 21 or younger at the time of the onset, while they occurred only in 40% of individuals 30 years or older at the time of the onset.

The underlying neurophysiology and psychopathology of Cotard syndrome might be related to problems of delusional misidentification. Neurologically, the Cotard delusion (negation of the Self) is thought to be related to the Capgras delusion (people replaced by impostors); each type of delusion is thought to result from neural misfiring in the fusiform face area of the brain (which recognizes faces) and in the amygdalae (which associate emotions to a recognized face).

The neural disconnection creates in the patient a sense that the face they are observing is not the face of the person to whom it belongs; therefore, that face lacks the familiarity (recognition) normally associated with it. This results in derealization, or a disconnection from the environment. If the observed face is that of a person known to the patient, they experience that face as the face of an impostor (the Capgras delusion). If the patient sees their own face, they might perceive no association between the face and their own sense of Self—which results in the patient believing that they do not exist (the Cotard delusion).

Cotard's syndrome is usually encountered in people afflicted with a psychosis (e.g., schizophrenia ), neurological illness, mental illness, clinical depression, derealization, brain tumor, and with migraine headache. The medical literature indicate that the occurrence of Cotard's delusion is associated with lesions in the parietal lobe. As such, the Cotard-delusion patient presents a greater incidence of brain atrophy—especially of the median frontal lobe—than do the people in the control groups.

The Cotard delusion also has resulted from a patient's adverse physiological response to a drug (e.g., aciclovir) and to its prodrug precursor (e.g., valaciclovir). The occurrence of Cotard delusion symptoms was associated with a high serum-concentration of 9-Carboxymethoxymethylguanine (CMMG), the principal metabolite of the drug aciclovir. As such, the patient with weak kidneys (impaired renal function) continued risking the occurrence of delusional symptoms, despite the reduction of the dose of aciclovir. Hemodialysis resolved the patient's delusions (of negating the Self) within hours of treatment, which suggests that the occurrence of Cotard-delusion symptoms might not always be cause for psychiatric hospitalization of the patient.

Sluggish schizophrenia or slow progressive schizophrenia (, "vyalotekushchaya shizofreniya") was a diagnostic category used in Soviet Union to describe what they claimed was a form of schizophrenia characterized by a slowly progressive course; it was diagnosed even in a patient who showed no symptoms of schizophrenia or other psychotic disorders, on the assumption that these symptoms would appear later. It was developed in the 1960s by Soviet psychiatrist Andrei Snezhnevsky and his colleagues, and was used exclusively in the USSR and several Eastern Bloc countries, until the fall of Communism starting in 1989. The diagnosis has long been discredited because of its scientific inadequacy and its use as a means of confining dissenters. It has never been used or recognized outside of Soviet Union, or by international organizations such as the World Health Organization. It is considered a prime example of the political abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union.

Sluggish schizophrenia was the most infamous of diagnoses used by Soviet psychiatrists, due to its usage against political dissidents. After being discharged from a hospital, persons diagnosed with sluggish schizophrenia were deprived of their civic rights, credibility and employability. The usage of this diagnosis has been internationally condemned.

In the Russian version of the 10th revision of the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD-10), which has long been used throughout present-day Russia, sluggish schizophrenia is no longer listed as a form of schizophrenia, but it is still included as a schizotypal disorder in section F21 of chapter V.

According to Sergei Jargin, the same Russian term "vyalotekushchaya" for sluggish schizophrenia continues to be used and is now translated in English summaries of articles not as "sluggish" but as "slow progressive".

The delusions that fall under this category are:

- Capgras delusion: the belief that (usually) a close relative or spouse has been replaced by an identical-looking impostor.

- Fregoli delusion: the belief that various people whom the believer meets are actually the same person in disguise.

- Intermetamorphosis: the belief that people in one's environment swap identities with each other while maintaining the same appearance.

- Subjective doubles: a person believes there is a doppelgänger or double of him- or herself carrying out independent actions.

- Cotard delusion: the belief that oneself is dead or does not exist; sometimes coupled with the belief that one is putrefying or missing internal organs.

- Mirrored-self misidentification: the belief that one's reflection in a mirror is some other person.

- Reduplicative paramnesia: the belief that a familiar person, place, object, or body part has been duplicated. For example, a person may believe that they are, in fact, not in the hospital to which they were admitted, but in an identical-looking hospital in a different part of the country.

- Somatoparaphrenia: the delusion where one denies ownership of a limb or an entire side of one's body (often connected with stroke).

Note that some of these delusions are sometimes grouped under the umbrella term of delusional misidentification syndrome.

The cause of delusional disorder is unknown, but genetic, biochemical, and environmental factors may play a significant role in its development. Some people with delusional disorders may have an imbalance in neurotransmitters, the chemicals that send and receive messages to the brain. There does seem to be some familial component, and social isolation, immigration (generally for persecutory reasons), drug abuse, excessive stress, being married, being employed, low socioeconomic status, celibacy among men, and widowhood among women may also be risk factors. Delusional disorder is currently thought to be on the same spectrum or dimension as schizophrenia, but people with delusional disorder, in general, may have less symptomatology and functional disability.