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The following two case reports are examples of the Capgras delusion in a psychiatric setting:
The following case is an instance of the Capgras delusion resulting from a neurodegenerative disease:
Capgras delusion is a psychiatric disorder in which a person holds a delusion that a friend, spouse, parent, or other close family member (or pet) has been replaced by an identical impostor. The Capgras delusion is classified as a delusional misidentification syndrome, a class of delusional beliefs that involves the misidentification of people, places, or objects. It can occur in acute, transient, or chronic forms. Cases in which patients hold the belief that time has been "warped" or "substituted" have also been reported.
The delusion most commonly occurs in patients diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, but has also been seen in patients suffering from brain injury and dementia. It presents often in individuals with a neurodegenerative disease, particularly at an older age. It has also been reported as occurring in association with diabetes, hypothyroidism, and migraine attacks. In one isolated case, the Capgras delusion was temporarily induced in a healthy subject by the drug ketamine. It occurs more frequently in females, with a female:male ratio of approximately 3:2. It is worth noting that there is historical and quite probably modern use of the Political decoy as well as Celebrity lookalike, and impersonation is used by criminals, as well. Although 'delusion' is defined as when a patient holds a false belief "in spite of incontrovertible evidence", such evidence is difficult to produce (in the case of Capgras symptoms), whether lookalikes exist or not. This does not deter psychiatrists from prescribing pharmaceutical chemicals for persons describing these situations with little, if any, investigation into the claims, though it seems even one actual encounter with a genuine impersonator (whether sinister or not) has a notably unnerving effect on future interactions with that actual person, and possibly leading to paranoia of others being impersonated. Carefully targeted identity thefts in this sense can cause quite a few real problems, ranging from confusion to petty theft, business and domestic situations going awry, sexual relationship sabotage or confusion (possibility of unplanned pregnancy and risk of STD exposure), and financial fraud.
The delusions that fall under this category are:
- Capgras delusion: the belief that (usually) a close relative or spouse has been replaced by an identical-looking impostor.
- Fregoli delusion: the belief that various people whom the believer meets are actually the same person in disguise.
- Intermetamorphosis: the belief that people in one's environment swap identities with each other while maintaining the same appearance.
- Subjective doubles: a person believes there is a doppelgänger or double of him- or herself carrying out independent actions.
- Cotard delusion: the belief that oneself is dead or does not exist; sometimes coupled with the belief that one is putrefying or missing internal organs.
- Mirrored-self misidentification: the belief that one's reflection in a mirror is some other person.
- Reduplicative paramnesia: the belief that a familiar person, place, object, or body part has been duplicated. For example, a person may believe that they are, in fact, not in the hospital to which they were admitted, but in an identical-looking hospital in a different part of the country.
- Somatoparaphrenia: the delusion where one denies ownership of a limb or an entire side of one's body (often connected with stroke).
Note that some of these delusions are sometimes grouped under the umbrella term of delusional misidentification syndrome.
Explaining the causes of delusions continues to be challenging and several theories have been developed. One is the genetic or biological theory, which states that close relatives of people with delusional disorder are at increased risk of delusional traits. Another theory is the dysfunctional cognitive processing, which states that delusions may arise from distorted ways people have of explaining life to themselves. A third theory is called motivated or defensive delusions. This one states that some of those persons who are predisposed might suffer the onset of delusional disorder in those moments when coping with life and maintaining high self-esteem becomes a significant challenge. In this case, the person views others as the cause of their personal difficulties in order to preserve a positive self-view.
This condition is more common among people who have poor hearing or sight. Also, ongoing stressors have been associated with a higher possibility of developing delusions. Examples of such stressors are immigration, low socioeconomic status, and even possibly the accumulation of smaller daily hassles.
Current cognitive neuropsychology research points toward a two-factor approach to the cause of monothematic delusions. The first factor being the anomalous experience—often a neurological defect—which leads to the delusion, and the second factor being an impairment of the belief formation cognitive process.
As an example of one of these first factors, several studies point toward Capgras delusion being the result of a disorder of the affect component of face perception. As a result, while the person can recognize their spouse (or other close relation) they do not feel the typical emotional reaction, and thus the spouse does not seem like the person they once knew.
As studies have shown, these neurological defects are not enough on their own to cause delusional thinking. An additional second factor—a bias or impairment of the belief formation cognitive process—is required to solidify and maintain the delusion. Since we do not currently have a solid cognitive model of the belief formation process, this second factor is still somewhat of an unknown.
Some research has shown that delusional people are more prone to jumping to conclusions, and thus they would be more likely to take their anomalous experience as veridical and make snap judgments based on these experiences. Additionally, studies have shown that they are more prone to making errors due to matching bias—indicative of a tendency to try and confirm the rule. These two judgment biases help explain how delusion-prone people could grasp onto extreme delusions and be very resistant to change.
Researchers claim this is enough to explain the delusional thinking. However, other researchers still argue that these biases are not enough to explain why they remain completely impervious to evidence over time. They believe that there must be some additional unknown neurological defect in the patient's belief system (probably in the right hemisphere).
The top two factors mainly concerned in the germination of delusions are: 1. Disorder of brain functioning; and 2. background influences of temperament and personality.
Higher levels of dopamine qualify as a symptom of disorders of brain function. That they are needed to sustain certain delusions was examined by a preliminary study on delusional disorder (a psychotic syndrome) instigated to clarify if schizophrenia had a dopamine psychosis. There were positive results - delusions of jealousy and persecution had different levels of dopamine metabolite HVA and homovanillyl alcohol (which may have been genetic). These can be only regarded as tentative results; the study called for future research with a larger population.
It is too simplistic to say that a certain measure of dopamine will bring about a specific delusion. Studies show age and gender to be influential and it is most likely that HVA levels change during the life course of some syndromes.
On the influence personality, it has been said: "Jaspers considered there is a subtle change in personality due to the illness itself; and this creates the condition for the development of the delusional atmosphere in which the delusional intuition arises."
Cultural factors have "a decisive influence in shaping delusions". For example, delusions of guilt and punishment are frequent in a Western, Christian country like Austria, but not in Pakistan - where it is more likely persecution. Similarly, in a series of case studies, delusions of guilt and punishment were found in Austrian patients with Parkinson's being treated with l-dopa - a dopamine agonist.
One hypothesis is that brain dysfunction (either due to physical damage or damage from an organic disorder) in the right hemisphere, temporal lobe, and/or bi-frontal lobes causes the delusion of subjective doubles. Physical damage resulting in the subjective doubles delusion often includes, but is not limited to brain lesions or traumatic brain injury. Suspected organic causes of brain damage that may lead to subjective doubles include disorders such as epilepsy.
Because other mental illnesses are commonly co-morbid with subjective doubles syndrome, it is unknown whether these types of brain injuries are linked to the delusion or the additional mental illness. For example, right hemisphere brain damage is associated with schizophrenia, which is commonly reported with the delusion of subjective doubles.
Subjective doubles is commonly comorbid with other psychiatric illnesses, such as bipolar disorder or schizophrenia. The cause of the disorder is difficult to ascertain not only because of its rarity, but also due to the simultaneous presence of other disorders. While the physiological cause of the syndrome of subjective doubles has not been found, many hypotheses exist.
Some researchers believe that the syndrome of subjective doubles appears as a symptom of another disorder instead of a disorder of its own. (see #Controversy, below)
The syndrome of subjective doubles may also be related to substance dependence.
Another hypothesis states that subjective doubles is result of hyper-identification, linked to over-activity in certain areas of the brain, thereby causing the patient see familiar aspects of the self in strangers.
Some hypothesize that this delusion is a result of facial processing deficiencies, as it has seemingly similar symptoms of prosopagnosia; however, it must be noted that recognition of most faces is impaired in this delusion. Facial processing deficiencies also do not account for the occasion in which multiple doubles are reported.
Another hypothesis is that a "disconnection" between the right and left hemispheres may cause the delusional symptoms. This hypothesis relies heavily on the theory of lateralization of brain function, or left brain vs. right brain theory. In this hypothesis, the inability of the right hemisphere to "check" the left hemisphere causes the individual to succumb to delusions of self-awareness created by the left hemisphere.
Levodopa, also known as L-DOPA, is the precursor to several catecholamines, specifically of dopamine, epinephrine and norepinephrine. It is clinically used to treat Parkinson's disease and dopamine-responsive dystonia. Clinical studies have shown that the use of levodopa can lead to visual hallucinations and delusions. In most patients, delusions were more salient than hallucinations. With prolonged use of levodopa, the delusions occupy almost all of a patient's attention. In experimental studies, when the concentration of levodopa decreases, the number of reported delusions decreases as well. It has been concluded that delusions related to antiparkinsonian medications are one of the leading causes of Fregoli syndrome.
The Fregoli delusion, or the delusion of doubles, is a rare disorder in which a person holds a delusional belief that different people are in fact a single person who changes appearance or is in disguise. The syndrome may be related to a brain lesion and is often of a paranoid nature, with the delusional person believing themselves persecuted by the person they believe is in disguise.
A person with the Fregoli delusion can also inaccurately recall places, objects, and events. This disorder can be explained by "associative nodes". The associative nodes serve as a biological link of information about other people with a particular familiar face (to the patient). This means that for any face that is similar to a recognizable face to the patient, the patient will recall that face as the person they know.
The Fregoli delusion is classed both as a monothematic delusion, since it only encompasses one delusional topic, and as a delusional misidentification syndrome (DMS), a class of delusional beliefs that involves misidentifying people, places, or objects. Like Capgras delusion, psychiatrists believe it is related to a breakdown in normal face perception.
Delusional disorders are uncommon in psychiatric practice, though this may be an underestimation due to the fact that those afflicted lack insight and thus avoid psychiatric assessment. The prevalence of this condition stands at about 24 to 30 cases per 100,000 people while 0.7 to 3.0 new cases per 100,000 people are reported every year. Delusional disorder accounts for 1–2% of admissions to inpatient mental health facilities. The incidence of first admissions for delusional disorder is lower, from 0.001–0.003%.
Delusional disorder tends to appear in middle to late adult life, and for the most part first admissions to hospital for delusional disorder occur between age 33 and 55. It is more common in women than men, and immigrants seem to be at higher risk.
In researching over 1000 individuals of vast range of backgrounds, Stompe and colleagues (2006) found that grandiosity remains as the second most common delusion after persecutory delusions. A variation in the occurrence of grandiosity delusions in schizophrenic patients across cultures has also been observed. In research done by Appelbaum "et al." it has been found that GDs appeared more commonly in patients with bipolar disorder (59%) than in patients with schizophrenia (49%), followed by presence in substance misuse disorder patients (30%) and depressed patients (21%).
A relationship has been claimed between the age of onset of bipolar disorder and the occurrence of GDs. According to Carlson "et al." (2000), grandiose delusions appeared in 74% of the patients who were 21 or younger at the time of the onset, while they occurred only in 40% of individuals 30 years or older at the time of the onset.
Delusional misidentification syndrome is an umbrella term, introduced by Christodoulou (in his book "The Delusional Misidentification Syndromes", Karger, Basel, 1986) for a group of delusional disorders that occur in the context of mental and neurological illness. They all involve a belief that the identity of a person, object, or place has somehow changed or has been altered. As these delusions typically only concern one particular topic, they also fall under the category called monothematic delusions.
This psychopathological syndrome is usually considered to include four main variants:
- The Capgras delusion is the belief that (usually) a close relative or spouse has been replaced by an identical-looking impostor.
- The Fregoli delusion is the belief that various people the believer meets are actually the same person in disguise.
- Intermetamorphosis is the belief that people in the environment swap identities with each other whilst maintaining the same appearance.
- Subjective doubles, described by Christodoulou in 1978 ("American Journal of Psychiatry" 135, 249, 1978), is the belief that there is a doppelgänger or double of him- or herself carrying out independent actions.
However, similar delusional beliefs, often singularly or more rarely reported, are sometimes also considered to be part of the delusional misidentification syndrome. For example:
- Mirrored-self misidentification is the belief that one's reflection in a mirror is some other person.
- Reduplicative paramnesia is the belief that a familiar person, place, object, or body part has been duplicated. For example, a person may believe that they are in fact not in the hospital to which they were admitted, but an identical-looking hospital in a different part of the country, despite this being obviously false.
- The Cotard delusion is a rare disorder in which people hold a delusional belief that they are dead (either figuratively or literally), do not exist, are putrefying, or have lost their blood or internal organs. In rare instances, it can include delusions of immortality.
- Syndrome of delusional companions is the belief that objects (such as soft toys) are sentient beings.
- Clonal pluralization of the self, where a person believes there are multiple copies of him- or herself, identical both physically and psychologically but physically separate and distinct.
There is considerable evidence that disorders such as the Capgras or Fregoli syndromes are associated with disorders of face perception and recognition. However, it has been suggested that all misidentification problems exist on a continuum of anomalies of familiarity, from déjà vu at one end to the formation of delusional beliefs at the other.
The cause of delusional disorder is unknown, but genetic, biochemical, and environmental factors may play a significant role in its development. Some people with delusional disorders may have an imbalance in neurotransmitters, the chemicals that send and receive messages to the brain. There does seem to be some familial component, and social isolation, immigration (generally for persecutory reasons), drug abuse, excessive stress, being married, being employed, low socioeconomic status, celibacy among men, and widowhood among women may also be risk factors. Delusional disorder is currently thought to be on the same spectrum or dimension as schizophrenia, but people with delusional disorder, in general, may have less symptomatology and functional disability.
Examples from a 295-subject study in Lithuania showed that the most common religious delusions were being a saint (in women) and being God (in men).
In one study of 193 people who had previously been admitted to hospital and subsequently diagnosed with schizophrenia, 24% were found to have religious delusions.
A 1999 study identified that religious delusions were often present or expressed in persons with forensic committal to a psychiatric unit.
A paranoid reaction may be caused from a decline in brain circulation as a result of high blood pressure or hardening of the arterial walls.
Drug-induced paranoia, associated with amphetamines, methamphetamine and similar stimulants has much in common with schizophrenic paranoia; the relationship has been under investigation since 2012. Drug-induced paranoia has a better prognosis than schizophrenic paranoia once the drug has been removed. For further information, see Stimulant psychosis and Substance-induced psychosis.
Based on data obtained by the Dutch NEMISIS project in 2005, there was an association between impaired hearing and the onset of symptoms of psychosis, which was based on a five-year follow up. Some older studies have actually declared that a state of paranoia can be produced in patients that were under a hypnotic state of deafness. This idea however generated much skepticism during its time.
Chronic hallucinatory psychosis is a psychosis subtype, classified under "Other nonorganic psychosis" by the . Other abnormal mental symptoms in the early stages are, as a rule, absent. The patient is most usually quiet and orderly, with a good memory.
It has often been a matter of the greatest difficulty to decide under which heading of the recognized classifications individual members of this group should be placed. As the hallucinations give rise to slight depression, some might possibly be included under melancholia. In others, paranoia may develop. Others, again, might be swept into the widespread net of dementia praecox. This state of affairs cannot be regarded as satisfactory, for they are not truly cases of melancholia, paranoia, dementia praecox or any other described affection.
This disease, as its name suggests, is a hallucinatory case, for it is its main feature. These may be of all senses, but auditory hallucinations are the most prominent. At the beginning, the patient may realize that the hallucination is a morbid phenomenon and unaccountable. They may claim to hear a "voice" speaking, though there is no one in the flesh actually doing so. Such a state of affairs may last for years and possibly, though rarely, for life, and the subject would not be deemed insane in the ordinary sense of the word.
It's probable, however, that this condition forms the first stage of the illness, which eventually develops on definite lines. What usually happens is the patient seeks an explanation for the hallucinations. As none is forthcoming he/she tries to account for their presence and the result is a delusion, and, most frequently, a delusion of persecution. Also, it needs to be noted that the delusion is a comparatively late arrival and is the logical result of the hallucinations.
Individuals experiencing religious delusions are preoccupied with religious subjects that are not within the expected beliefs for an individual's background, including culture, education, and known experiences of religion. These preoccupations are incongruous with the mood of the subject. Falling within the definition also are delusions arising in psychotic depression; however, these must present within a major depressive episode and be congruous with mood.
Researchers in a 2000 study found religious delusions to be unrelated to any specific set of diagnostic criteria, but correlated with demographic criteria, primarily age. In a comparative study sampling 313 patients, those with religious delusion were found to be aged older, and had been placed on a drug regime or started a treatment programme at an earlier stage. In the context of presentation, their global functioning was found to be worse than another group of patients without religious delusions. The first group also scored higher on the Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms (SAPS), had a greater total on the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS), and were treated with a higher mean number of neuroleptic medications of differing types during their hospitalization.
Religious delusion was found in 2007 to strongly correlate with "temporolimbic overactivity". This is a condition where irregularities in the brain's limbic system may present as symptoms of paranoid schizophrenia.
In a 2010 study, Swiss psychiatrists found religious delusions with themes of spiritual persecution by malevolent spirit-entities, control exerted over the person by spirit-entities, delusional experience of sin and guilt, or delusions of grandeur.
Religious delusions have generally been found to be less stressful than other types of delusion. A study found adherents to new religious movements to have similar delusionary cognition, as rated by the Delusions Inventory, to a psychotic group, although the former reported feeling less distressed by their experiences than the latter.
Many researchers believe that individuals with paranoia have some sort of cognitive deficit or impairment in reasoning ability or lack social credibility. Studies have shown that there may not be a direct relationship between the impairments and psychotic delusions, but they rather effect other areas of an individual's life, such as social circumstances
can be important factors about delusions. Other researchers have shown that cognitive abilities may be altered, such as when cameras or recordings are involved. This phenomenon appears to be a common theme among those exhibiting psychotic delusions. An investigation involving one hundred delusional patients did indeed reveal that these individuals may have a tendency to jump to conclusions rather than look for other potential information.
The article "Betwixt Life and Death: Case Studies of the Cotard Delusion" (1996) describes a contemporary case of Cotard delusion, which occurred in a Scotsman whose brain was damaged in a motorcycle accident:
The article "Recurrent Postictal Depression with Cotard Delusion" (2005) describes the case of a fourteen-year-old epileptic boy whose distorted perception of reality resulted from Cotard syndrome. His mental health history was of a boy expressing themes of death, chronic sadness, decreased physical activity in playtime, social withdrawal, and disturbed biological functions. About twice a year, the boy suffered episodes that lasted between three weeks and three months. In the course of each episode, he said that everyone and everything was dead (including trees), described himself as a dead body, and warned that the world would be destroyed within hours. Throughout the episode, the boy showed no response to pleasurable stimuli and had no interest in social activities.
Confabulation is distinguished from lying as there is no intent to deceive and the person is unaware the information is false. Although individuals can present blatantly false information, confabulation can also seem to be coherent, internally consistent, and relatively normal.
Most known cases of confabulation are symptomatic of brain damage or dementias, such as aneurysm, Alzheimer's disease, or Wernicke–Korsakoff syndrome (a common manifestation of thiamine deficiency caused by alcoholism). Additionally confabulation often occurs in people who are suffering from anticholinergic toxidrome when interrogated about bizarre or irrational behaviour.
Confabulated memories of all types most often occur in autobiographical memory and are indicative of a complicated and intricate process that can be led astray at any point during encoding, storage, or recall of a memory. This type of confabulation is commonly seen in Korsakoff's syndrome.
The delusion of negation is the central symptom in Cotard's syndrome. The patient afflicted with this mental illness usually denies his or her existence, the existence of a certain body part, or the existence of a portion of their body. Cotard's syndrome exists in three stages: (i) Germination stage—the symptoms of psychotic depression and of hypochondria appear; (ii) Blooming stage—the full development of the syndrome and the delusions of negation; and (iii) Chronic stage—continued, severe delusions along with chronic psychiatric depression.
The Cotard syndrome withdraws the afflicted person from other people due to the neglect of their personal hygiene and physical health. The delusion of negation of self prevents the patient from making sense of external reality, which then produces a distorted view of the external world. Such a delusion of negation is usually found in the psychotic patient who also presents with schizophrenia. Although a diagnosis of Cotard's syndrome does not require the patient's having had hallucinations, the strong delusions of negation are comparable to those found in schizophrenic patients.
It is normal to have some level of memory distrust, or the lack of trusting in one's own memory. This may occur when speaking with your parents about your childhood, for example. However it seems that everyone has their own level of memory distrust, and memory distrust syndrome seems to be a severe case.
The direct cause is unknown; however, it is possibly a defense or coping mechanism to a preexisting condition that would alter one's memory. This could involve frontal lobe lesions, Alzheimer's disease, amnesia, dementia, or other conditions. Any condition that would alter either existing memories or the formation of new memories could cause a coping scheme such as memory distrust syndrome. Alternatively, an individual may have learned over time to not trust their own memory from conditioning, and as such the individual would develop a defense mechanism to remove themselves from potential embarrassment.
Ideas of reference and delusions of reference describe the phenomenon of an individual's experiencing innocuous events or mere coincidences and believing they have strong personal significance. It is "the notion that everything one perceives in the world relates to one's own destiny".
In psychiatry, delusions of reference form part of the diagnostic criteria for psychotic illnesses such as schizophrenia, delusional disorder, bipolar disorder (during the elevated stages of mania), as well as schizotypal personality disorder. To a lesser extent, it can be a hallmark of paranoid personality disorder. Such symptoms can also be caused by intoxication, especially with hallucinogens or stimulants like methamphetamine.
Confabulation is associated with several characteristics:
1. Typically verbal statements but can also be non-verbal gestures or actions.
2. Can include autobiographical and non-personal information, such as historical facts, fairy-tales, or other aspects of semantic memory.
3. The account can be fantastic or coherent.
4. Both the premise and the details of the account can be false.
5. The account is usually drawn from the patient's memory of actual experiences, including past and current thoughts.
6. The patient is unaware of the accounts' distortions or inappropriateness, and is not concerned when errors are pointed out.
7. There is no hidden motivation behind the account.
8. The patient's personality structure may play a role in his/her readiness to confabulate.