Individual therapy may be best suited to treat the individual's delusions. Persistence is needed in establishing a therapeutic empathy without validating the patient’s delusional system or overtly confronting the system. Cognitive techniques that include reality testing and reframing can be used. Antipsychotics and other therapeutic drugs have been used with relative success.

Once it has been positively identified, pharmacotherapy follows. Antipsychotic drugs are the frontrunners in treatment for Fregoli and other DMSs. In addition to antipsychotics, anticonvulsants and antidepressants are also prescribed in some treatment courses. If a Fregoli patient has other psychological disorders, treatment often results in the use of trifluoperazine.

The following two case reports are examples of the Capgras delusion in a psychiatric setting:

The following case is an instance of the Capgras delusion resulting from a neurodegenerative disease:

The delusions that fall under this category are:

- Capgras delusion: the belief that (usually) a close relative or spouse has been replaced by an identical-looking impostor.

- Fregoli delusion: the belief that various people whom the believer meets are actually the same person in disguise.

- Intermetamorphosis: the belief that people in one's environment swap identities with each other while maintaining the same appearance.

- Subjective doubles: a person believes there is a doppelgänger or double of him- or herself carrying out independent actions.

- Cotard delusion: the belief that oneself is dead or does not exist; sometimes coupled with the belief that one is putrefying or missing internal organs.

- Mirrored-self misidentification: the belief that one's reflection in a mirror is some other person.

- Reduplicative paramnesia: the belief that a familiar person, place, object, or body part has been duplicated. For example, a person may believe that they are, in fact, not in the hospital to which they were admitted, but in an identical-looking hospital in a different part of the country.

- Somatoparaphrenia: the delusion where one denies ownership of a limb or an entire side of one's body (often connected with stroke).

Note that some of these delusions are sometimes grouped under the umbrella term of delusional misidentification syndrome.

A monothematic delusion is a delusional state that concerns only one particular topic. This is contrasted by what is sometimes called "multi-thematic" or "polythematic" delusions where the person has a range of delusions (typically the case of schizophrenia). These disorders can occur within the context of schizophrenia or dementia or they can occur without any other signs of mental illness. When these disorders are found outside the context of mental illness, they are often caused by organic dysfunction as a result of traumatic brain injury, stroke, or neurological illness.

People who experience these delusions as a result of organic dysfunction often do not have any obvious intellectual deficiency nor do they have any other symptoms. Additionally, a few of these people even have some awareness that their beliefs are bizarre, yet they cannot be persuaded that their beliefs are false.

Psychotherapies that may be helpful in delusional disorder include individual psychotherapy, cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT), and family therapy.

A widely accepted treatment for the syndrome of subjective doubles has not been developed. Treatment methods for this disease sometimes include the prescription of antipsychotic drugs, however, the type of drug prescribed depends on the presence of other mental disorders. Antipsychotic drugs (also known as neuroleptics) such as risperidone, pimozide, or haloperidol may be prescribed to treat the underlying psychiatric illness.

In addition to drug therapy, interpersonal counseling has also been suggested as a method to ease relations between the patient and his/her suspected doubles. However, the relationship between the patient and his/her double is not always negative.

Delusional misidentification syndromes (DMS) are rooted in the inability to register the identity of something, whether it is an object, event, place or even a person. There are various forms of DMS, such as the syndrome of subjective doubles, intermetamorphosis, Capgras syndrome and Fregoli syndrome. However, all of these various syndromes have a common denominator: they are all due to malfunctional familiarity processing during information processing. The most common syndromes are Capgras and Fregoli. Capgras syndrome is the delusional belief that a friend, family member, etc., has been replaced by a twin impostor. Fregoli syndrome is the delusional belief that different people are in fact a single person who is in disguise. Other commonalities among these syndromes are that they are discriminatory in which object(s) are misidentified. Lastly, dopamine hyperactivity is evident in all DMSs and thus, all syndromes utilize antipsychotic medications to help control DMS.

The article "Cotard's syndrome: A Review" (2010) reports successful pharmacological treatments (mono-therapeutic and multi-therapeutic) using antidepressant, antipsychotic, and mood stabilizing drugs; likewise, with the depressed patient, electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) is more effective than pharmacotherapy. Cotard syndrome resulting from an adverse drug reaction to valacyclovir is attributed to elevated serum concentration of one of valacyclovir's metabolites, 9-carboxymethoxymethylguanine (CMMG). Successful treatment warrants cessation of the drug, valacyclovir. Hemodialysis was associated with timely clearance of CMMG and resolution of symptoms.

Recovery from this syndrome is situational, as some drug therapies have been effective in some individuals but not others. Patients may live in a variety of settings, including psychiatric hospitals, depending on the success of treatment. With successful treatment, an individual may live at home. In many of the reported cases, remission of symptoms occurred during the follow-up period.

This disorder can be dangerous to the patient and others, as a patient may interrogate or attack a person they believe to be a double. Inappropriate behavior such as stalking and physical or psychological abuse has been documented in some case studies. Consequently, many individuals suffering from this disorder are arrested for the resulting misconduct (see the case of Mr. B in #Presentation).

Explaining the causes of delusions continues to be challenging and several theories have been developed. One is the genetic or biological theory, which states that close relatives of people with delusional disorder are at increased risk of delusional traits. Another theory is the dysfunctional cognitive processing, which states that delusions may arise from distorted ways people have of explaining life to themselves. A third theory is called motivated or defensive delusions. This one states that some of those persons who are predisposed might suffer the onset of delusional disorder in those moments when coping with life and maintaining high self-esteem becomes a significant challenge. In this case, the person views others as the cause of their personal difficulties in order to preserve a positive self-view.

This condition is more common among people who have poor hearing or sight. Also, ongoing stressors have been associated with a higher possibility of developing delusions. Examples of such stressors are immigration, low socioeconomic status, and even possibly the accumulation of smaller daily hassles.

Treatment for confabulation is somewhat dependent on the cause or source, if identifiable. For example, treatment of Wernicke–Korsakoff syndrome involves large doses of vitamin B in order to reverse the thiamine deficiency. If there is no known physiological cause, more general cognitive techniques may be used to treat confabulation. A case study published in 2000 showed that Self-Monitoring Training (SMT) reduced delusional confabulations. Furthermore, improvements were maintained at a three-month follow-up and were found to generalize to everyday settings. Although this treatment seems promising, more rigorous research is necessary to determine the efficacy of SMT in the general confabulation population.

A challenge in the treatment of delusional disorders is that most patients have limited insight, and do not acknowledge that there is a problem. Most patients are treated as out-patients, although hospitalization may be required in some cases if there is a risk of harm to self or others. Individual psychotherapy is recommended rather than group psychotherapy, as patients are often quite suspicious and sensitive. Antipsychotics are not well tested in delusional disorder, but they do not seem to work very well, and often have no effect on the core delusional belief. Antipsychotics may be more useful in managing agitation that can accompany delusional disorder. Until further evidence is found, it seems reasonable to offer treatments which have efficacy in other psychotic disorders.

Psychotherapy for patients with delusional disorder can include cognitive therapy which is conducted with the use of empathy. During the process, the therapist can ask hypothetical questions in a form of therapeutic Socratic questioning. This therapy has been mostly studied in patients with the persecutory type. The combination of pharmacotherapy with cognitive therapy integrates treating the possible underlying biological problems and decreasing the symptoms with psychotherapy as well. Psychotherapy has been said to be the most useful form of treatment because of the trust formed in a patient and therapist relationship.

Supportive therapy has also been shown to be helpful. Its goal is to facilitate treatment adherence and provide education about the illness and its treatment.

Furthermore, providing social skills training has helped many persons. It can promote interpersonal competence as well as confidence and comfort when interacting with those individuals perceived as a threat.

Insight-oriented therapy is rarely indicated or contraindicated; yet there are reports of successful treatment. Its goals are to develop therapeutic alliance, containment of projected feelings of hatred, impotence, and badness; measured interpretation as well as the development of a sense of creative doubt in the internal perception of the world. The latter requires empathy with the patient's defensive position.

Chronic hallucinatory psychosis is a psychosis subtype, classified under "Other nonorganic psychosis" by the . Other abnormal mental symptoms in the early stages are, as a rule, absent. The patient is most usually quiet and orderly, with a good memory.

It has often been a matter of the greatest difficulty to decide under which heading of the recognized classifications individual members of this group should be placed. As the hallucinations give rise to slight depression, some might possibly be included under melancholia. In others, paranoia may develop. Others, again, might be swept into the widespread net of dementia praecox. This state of affairs cannot be regarded as satisfactory, for they are not truly cases of melancholia, paranoia, dementia praecox or any other described affection.

This disease, as its name suggests, is a hallucinatory case, for it is its main feature. These may be of all senses, but auditory hallucinations are the most prominent. At the beginning, the patient may realize that the hallucination is a morbid phenomenon and unaccountable. They may claim to hear a "voice" speaking, though there is no one in the flesh actually doing so. Such a state of affairs may last for years and possibly, though rarely, for life, and the subject would not be deemed insane in the ordinary sense of the word.

It's probable, however, that this condition forms the first stage of the illness, which eventually develops on definite lines. What usually happens is the patient seeks an explanation for the hallucinations. As none is forthcoming he/she tries to account for their presence and the result is a delusion, and, most frequently, a delusion of persecution. Also, it needs to be noted that the delusion is a comparatively late arrival and is the logical result of the hallucinations.

Delusional misidentification syndrome is an umbrella term, introduced by Christodoulou (in his book "The Delusional Misidentification Syndromes", Karger, Basel, 1986) for a group of delusional disorders that occur in the context of mental and neurological illness. They all involve a belief that the identity of a person, object, or place has somehow changed or has been altered. As these delusions typically only concern one particular topic, they also fall under the category called monothematic delusions.

This psychopathological syndrome is usually considered to include four main variants:

- The Capgras delusion is the belief that (usually) a close relative or spouse has been replaced by an identical-looking impostor.

- The Fregoli delusion is the belief that various people the believer meets are actually the same person in disguise.

- Intermetamorphosis is the belief that people in the environment swap identities with each other whilst maintaining the same appearance.

- Subjective doubles, described by Christodoulou in 1978 ("American Journal of Psychiatry" 135, 249, 1978), is the belief that there is a doppelgänger or double of him- or herself carrying out independent actions.

However, similar delusional beliefs, often singularly or more rarely reported, are sometimes also considered to be part of the delusional misidentification syndrome. For example:

- Mirrored-self misidentification is the belief that one's reflection in a mirror is some other person.

- Reduplicative paramnesia is the belief that a familiar person, place, object, or body part has been duplicated. For example, a person may believe that they are in fact not in the hospital to which they were admitted, but an identical-looking hospital in a different part of the country, despite this being obviously false.

- The Cotard delusion is a rare disorder in which people hold a delusional belief that they are dead (either figuratively or literally), do not exist, are putrefying, or have lost their blood or internal organs. In rare instances, it can include delusions of immortality.

- Syndrome of delusional companions is the belief that objects (such as soft toys) are sentient beings.

- Clonal pluralization of the self, where a person believes there are multiple copies of him- or herself, identical both physically and psychologically but physically separate and distinct.

There is considerable evidence that disorders such as the Capgras or Fregoli syndromes are associated with disorders of face perception and recognition. However, it has been suggested that all misidentification problems exist on a continuum of anomalies of familiarity, from déjà vu at one end to the formation of delusional beliefs at the other.

Examples from a 295-subject study in Lithuania showed that the most common religious delusions were being a saint (in women) and being God (in men).

In one study of 193 people who had previously been admitted to hospital and subsequently diagnosed with schizophrenia, 24% were found to have religious delusions.

A 1999 study identified that religious delusions were often present or expressed in persons with forensic committal to a psychiatric unit.

A 2012 paper suggested that, when compared with experiences today, psychiatric conditions associated with psychotic spectrum symptoms may be possible explanations for some revelatory driven experiences and activities such as those of Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and Saint Paul. However, the paper admits that the study was not aimed to deny supernatural elements, nor was it conclusive on whether their experiences were delusional in part or not at all.

Cotard delusion is a rare mental illness in which the affected person holds the delusional belief that they are already dead, do not exist, are putrefying, or have lost their blood or internal organs. Statistical analysis of a hundred-patient cohort indicates that the denial of self-existence is a symptom present in 69% of the cases of Cotard's syndrome; yet, paradoxically, 55% of the patients present delusions of immortality.

In 1880, the neurologist Jules Cotard described the condition as "Le délire des négations" ("The Delirium of Negation"), a psychiatric syndrome of varied severity. A mild case is characterized by despair and self-loathing, while a severe case is characterized by intense delusions of negation and chronic psychiatric depression. The case of Mademoiselle X describes a woman who denied the existence of parts of her body and of her need to eat. She said that she was condemned to eternal damnation and therefore could not die a natural death. In the course of suffering "The Delirium of Negation", Mademoiselle X died of starvation.

The Cotard delusion is not mentioned in either the "Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders" (DSM) or the tenth edition of the "International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems" (ICD-10) of the World Health Organization.

Treatment of secondary forms of delusional parasitosis are addressed by treating the primary associated psychological or physical condition. The primary form is treated much as other delusional disorders and schizophrenia. In the past, pimozide was the drug of choice when selecting from the typical antipsychotics. Currently, atypical antipsychotics such as olanzapine or risperidone are used as first line treatment.

However, it is also characteristic that sufferers will reject the diagnosis of delusional parasitosis by medical professionals, and very few are willing to be treated, despite demonstrable efficacy of treatment.

Ideas of reference and delusions of reference describe the phenomenon of an individual's experiencing innocuous events or mere coincidences and believing they have strong personal significance. It is "the notion that everything one perceives in the world relates to one's own destiny".

In psychiatry, delusions of reference form part of the diagnostic criteria for psychotic illnesses such as schizophrenia, delusional disorder, bipolar disorder (during the elevated stages of mania), as well as schizotypal personality disorder. To a lesser extent, it can be a hallmark of paranoid personality disorder. Such symptoms can also be caused by intoxication, especially with hallucinogens or stimulants like methamphetamine.

According to the Mayo Clinic, it is best to start receiving treatment for paranoid schizophrenia as early as possible and to maintain the treatment throughout life. Continuing treatment will help keep the serious symptoms under control and allow the person to lead a more fulfilling life. This illness is typically unpreventable.

It has a strong hereditary component with a first degree parent or sibling. There is some possibility that there are environmental influences including "prenatal exposure to a viral infection, low oxygen levels during birth (from prolonged labor or premature birth), exposure to a virus during infancy, early parental loss or separation, and verbal, physical or sexual abuse in childhood". Eliminating any of these factors could help reduce an individual's future risk of developing paranoid schizophrenia.

Confabulation is distinguished from lying as there is no intent to deceive and the person is unaware the information is false. Although individuals can present blatantly false information, confabulation can also seem to be coherent, internally consistent, and relatively normal.

Most known cases of confabulation are symptomatic of brain damage or dementias, such as aneurysm, Alzheimer's disease, or Wernicke–Korsakoff syndrome (a common manifestation of thiamine deficiency caused by alcoholism). Additionally confabulation often occurs in people who are suffering from anticholinergic toxidrome when interrogated about bizarre or irrational behaviour.

Confabulated memories of all types most often occur in autobiographical memory and are indicative of a complicated and intricate process that can be led astray at any point during encoding, storage, or recall of a memory. This type of confabulation is commonly seen in Korsakoff's syndrome.

Memory distrust syndrome is a condition coined by Gísli Guðjónsson and James MacKeith in 1982, in which an individual doubts the accuracy of their memory concerning the content and context of events of which they have experienced. Since the individual does not trust their own memory, they will commonly depend on outside sources of information rather than using their ability for recollection. Some believe that this may be a defense or coping mechanism to a preexisting faulty memory state such as Alzheimer's disease, amnesia, or possibly dementia.

The condition is generally considered to be related to source amnesia, which involves the inability to recall the basis for factual knowledge. The main difference between the two is that source amnesia is a lack of knowing the basis of knowledge, whereas memory distrust syndrome is a lack of believing the knowledge that exists. The fact that an individual lacks the trust in their own memory implies that the individual would have a reason or belief that would prevent them from the trust that most of us have in our recollections. Cases concerning memory distrust syndrome have led to documented false confessions in court cases.

Grandiose delusions (GD), delusions of grandeur, expansive delusions also known as megalomania are a subtype of delusion that occur in patients suffering from a wide range of psychiatric diseases, including two-thirds of patients in manic state of bipolar disorder, half of those with schizophrenia, patients with the grandiose subtype of delusional disorder, and a substantial portion of those with substance abuse disorders. GDs are characterized by fantastical beliefs that one is famous, omnipotent, wealthy, or otherwise very powerful. The delusions are generally fantastic and typically have a religious, science fictional, or supernatural theme. There is a relative lack of research into GD, in contrast to persecutory delusions and auditory hallucinations. About 10% of healthy people experience grandiose thoughts but do not meet full criteria for a diagnosis of GD.

In researching over 1000 individuals of vast range of backgrounds, Stompe and colleagues (2006) found that grandiosity remains as the second most common delusion after persecutory delusions. A variation in the occurrence of grandiosity delusions in schizophrenic patients across cultures has also been observed. In research done by Appelbaum "et al." it has been found that GDs appeared more commonly in patients with bipolar disorder (59%) than in patients with schizophrenia (49%), followed by presence in substance misuse disorder patients (30%) and depressed patients (21%).

A relationship has been claimed between the age of onset of bipolar disorder and the occurrence of GDs. According to Carlson "et al." (2000), grandiose delusions appeared in 74% of the patients who were 21 or younger at the time of the onset, while they occurred only in 40% of individuals 30 years or older at the time of the onset.